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Introduction 
 Even after years of policy and reform attempting to decrease debt and increase 
achievement, Detroit Public Schools are still considered to be in a state of near crisis.  In 2010, 
Detroit students scored the lowest out of every U.S. urban school district on U.S. Department of 
Education achievement exams (Foley, 2010).  Detroit has one of the lowest graduation rates in 
the country, if not the lowest (at 25%) (Headlee, 2007).  In the beginning of 2011, the district 
reported a legacy deficit of $363 million (Detroit Public Schools, 2011b).  In 2010, Arne 
Duncan, United States Secretary of Education, called Detroit Public Schools “arguably the worst 
urban school district in the country” (Oosting, 2010).  A year later, he said that he “couldn't be 
more hopeful, more optimistic about where Detroit can go” (Oosting, 2011). 
This thesis is a case study of the Detroit education system focusing on two current reform 
initiatives, the role of Emergency Financial Manager and the push to bring charter schools into 
the district.  These two initiatives are rooted in an evolution of education reform in Detroit and 
across the nation.  Thus, a large part of this thesis is an historical case study of the national 
context of education reform today and a presentation of the history of education in Detroit 
starting in 1919.  This thesis reveals how the national educational movements have affected the 
history of and current identity of reform initiatives in Detroit’s schools.  This national and 
historical context also teaches us about what makes a reform successful or not.  Through this 
thesis, takeaways—best practices and cautions—are summarized in bold1.  These conclusions are 
relevant to school districts across the nation. 
The research for this thesis also included field study interviews.  Presented in this paper is 
a process of reform—based on categories of interviewees’ stances on education reform—that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#!These takeaways can be found together in Appendix A!
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serves as a guide to thinking about the most effective ways to implement reform.  This thesis 
concludes with evaluations, takeaways, and improvements tailored to the Detroit school district 
based on the analysis of the interview data.  These conclusions specifically address the 
Emergency Financial Manager position and the increased presences of charters schools in Detroit 
as well as larger challenges that cannot be addressed only by the two initiatives focused on in 
this paper.   
The identity of powerful education reform in America has changed from one of coalitions 
to one of increased communication and collaboration today.  To enact the solutions and face the 
challenges presented in the following pages, every actor in our education system, from 
community members to national leaders, needs to begin working together to improve the schools 
of Detroit and our country. 
 
Background: Two Current Detroit Education Reforms 
To focus my interviews and subsequent analysis of Detroit’s schools, I chose to 
concentrate on two different reform efforts going on in the Detroit school district: the Emergency 
Financial Manager position and the increase in charter schools in the district.  These were the 
two reforms that characterized the current educational reform in Detroit.  The Emergency 
Financial Manager (EFM) of the Detroit Public Schools is a leadership position created in 2009 
for the purpose of improving the financial situation of the school district.  Today in 2012, the 
schools still have an elected school board as well as a superintendent of schools, but the EFM has 
the power to overrule them not only in fiscal matters but matters directly concerning academics 
as well.  The position is controversial in Detroit partially because it was created by the state, not 
the city, brings in someone with expertise in business instead of education, and gives them 
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autocratic power over the Detroit schools.  The current EFM Roy Roberts was appointed in May 
of 2011.  
 The push to turn a large amount of public schools into charter schools (about 40 schools 
or 30% of the existing publics in the year 2012) was a heavily discussed issue during my initial 
research (Wasko).  The EFM before Roberts, Robert Bobb, created a plan to bring in new 
operators to charter these new schools.  Roberts scaled down this proposal and chartered only 
five schools in the 2011-2012 school year (Roberts).  Although the current reform effort 
involving new charters may look differently than expected, 54,000 students in Detroit currently 
attend charter schools (Hing, 2010) compared to 66,000 attending public schools (Detroit Public 
Schools, 2011a).  Charter schools, as Walter McLean, a retired Detroit teacher, principal, and 
assistance superintendent, admitted to me: are not going away. 
These initiatives are so contemporary that there is a risk that some of the suggestions in 
this study may be irrelevant by 2013.  However, by being the first to evaluate these initiatives I 
believe that I have brought new material into the discussion of education reform and drawn 
conclusions that are currently relevant for actors in Detroit.  
 
Methodology: Case Study  
Robert Yin, a prominent author on case methods, says that an appropriately integrated 
study collects “data at every level of [a] complex organization, using a variety of… methods” 
(2006, p. 43).  Mixed methods, according to Yin, “embrace much more than the traditional 
dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative research” (Yin, 2006, p. 41).  This thesis’ study 
is built from a combination of field study, done though ten interviews, and archival study (Yin, 
2006).  Both methods will be described in following sections.   
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Yin stressed collecting and analyzing “data at every level of [a] complex organization.”  
Studying the education system in Detroit involved looking first at the national level of reform 
movements.  From there, the next level closer involved looking at the history of education 
reform in Detroit.  The next step was taking an intimate look at the system by speaking with 
people involved at every level of education reform.  The interviewees for this thesis were chosen 
based on their proximity to the issue to encompass every level of reform in Detroit. 
I made sure to “maintain the same point of reference” or “unit of analysis” in order to 
integrate my study (Yin, 2006, p. 43).  All levels of my analysis are focused on the role of 
Emergency Financial Manager, the introduction of charter schools, and the larger contextual 
problems in Detroit.   
 
Historical Perspective on Detroit Education Reform 
Methodology: Archival Analysis 
 The archival analysis has two parts: the first is the national context of the current reforms 
in Detroit and the second is the history of them.  The national context has been crafted largely 
out of two important works that received large national acclaim due to their complete look at 
historical national movements.   
Diane Ravitch’s piece The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How 
Testing and Choice are Undermining Education (2010), was based on her 40 years of experience 
in education reforms.  She reflects on A Nation At Risk (U. S. Department of Education, 1983) 
and other reports that frame the national context for contemporary reform.  Ravitch was once a 
strong supporter of the same issues she now criticizes. 
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Second, in As Good as it Gets (2010), Larry Cuban, another noted historian of education, 
focuses his critique on national educational movements by examining education reform in 
Austin, Texas.  While Ravitch addresses the topics of accountability and choice, the large-
spanning movements of today, Cuban considers more a larger range of the pieces of education 
reform.  He offers important cautions and suggestions for reformers that will help lead them to 
the best outcomes.  His advice, and Ravitch’s, shows up throughout this thesis.  
These books form a context for the history of Detroit schools from 1919 to 2002, 
summarized from the historical analysis of Jeffrey Mirel.  Mirel is a professor at the University 
of Michigan in the School of Education and an authority on the history of Detroit education 
reform.  His book The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, will serve as the backbone for 
the history that I present.  Using many sources, he compiles his own multi-dimensional story of 
the past in a complete, detailed way.  While his book covers the time between 1907 and 1999, a 
second piece of his titled Detroit: There Is Still a Long Road to Travel, and Success Is Far from 
Assured (2004), covers 1999 through approximately 2002.  This article is found in a compilation 
called Mayors in the Middle about mayoral takeovers of struggling school districts around the 
country.   
My summative history is largely a condensed version of Mirel’s history.  When choosing 
what to keep in the story and the large amount to remove, I wanted the summary to convey the 
most important facts from the past that affect the current situation today.  To extract the 
takeaways from the history, I considered first and foremost the changes that were attempted and 
whether they were successful or not, and why.  These mini arcs within the large timeline are the 
pieces that teach us what has worked or not in making positive educational change.   
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I put together the last piece of Detroit’s history, from 2002 through February 2012, from 
newspaper articles from that period.  Using archived articles from databases, I scanned through 
every piece mentioning “Detroit Public Schools.”  After constructing a history using every-side 
on the issues that I could find, I then whittled it down the way I had with Mirel’s book, looking 
for the important details and the stories from which we can drawn important takeaways.   
This history section is not entirely objective.  Although Mirel’s narrative is fairly fact-
oriented, as is mine, I have created a story that is not complete.  I have focused on the tales that 
teach us something I deemed as most important and informative.  The entire narrative also has a 
focus on the present initiatives of charter school choice and the business-oriented EFM role.   
 
National Context 
When the state of Michigan created the autocratic Emergency Financial Manager (EFM) 
position to run Detroit’s schools and filled the position, later, with a businessman, this was not 
unprecedented.  Detroit’s actions sit within a context of education reform that shapes what 
changes local districts around the country make.  The educational movements that have swept 
across the United States have influenced both the current role of EFM as well as the charter 
school push in Detroit. 
 In her book, Diane Ravitch (2010) reflects upon the beginning of two national 
movements: accountability and market-based choice.  The first began as a quest to create 
common national standards to make sure that students across the board were learning the same 
things (Ravitch, 2010).  It has now turned into the “accountability movement” to measure student 
learning on standardized tests and then to use those results to punish or reward teachers and 
schools (Ravitch, 2010). 
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 The underlying foundation of the school choice movement was a desire to introduce new 
ideas into the school system.  John Chubb and Terry Moe began discussing school choice in 
1990 (Ravitch, 2010).  They argued that public education was “owned” by “teachers’ unions and 
myriad associations of principals, school boards, education schools, book publishers, testing 
services, and many other[s]” all of whom benefited from keeping the schools the same (Ravitch, 
2010, p. 118).  Because of these many different stakeholders, fundamental school reform was 
impossible (Ravitch, 2010).  School choice, then, was the solution for making change.  The key 
to Chubb and Moe’s plan was to allow parents and students to choose which schools they wanted 
to attend thus creating an incentive for schools to please students (Ravitch, 2010).  This process 
allows students and families to hold schools accountable, hopefully leading to improved schools, 
instead of letting the school system be controlled by the interests that Chubb and Moe identified 
(Ravitch, 2010).   
 Albert Shanker, frequently named the founding father of the charter school movement, 
suggested that groups of teachers should be able to form their own schools and try new 
innovative pedagogy that would work for students who struggled in the traditional system 
(Ravitch, 2010).  He called these “charter schools” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 123).  But in 1993, he saw 
the “charter school” turn into something else (Ravitch, 2010).  Instead of being run by teachers, 
many new charters were operated by corporations who began to fight teachers’ unions (Ravitch, 
2010).  Shanker criticized the new charters’ lack of national standards and curriculum (Ravitch, 
2010).  Around the nation, these charter schools were most heavily populating in urban districts 
like Detroit because of the poor existing local academic options (Ravitch, 2010). 
Ravitch moved her focus from the national level to a local one, from which perspective 
we are privy to the nuances of these large reform movements.  She wrote about the hiring of a 
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non-educator superintendent to reform a district as he see fit, without rules, that was 
unprecedented.  San Diego’s school board elected this superintendent Alan Bersin in 1998 
(Ravitch, 2010).  Ravitch (2010) concluded that Bersin personified the accountability movement: 
demanding higher test scores, fighting the teachers’ unions, and believing that schools were 
wasteful and inefficient. 
Bersin had immediately made it clear that his reforms would be top-down, announcing, 
“you’ve got to jolt a system” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 53).  He explained that reform would not happen 
if you wait for consensus (Ravitch, 2010).  The teachers’ unions objected from the beginning, but 
Bersin pushed on without their buy-in, without coalition support, and school faculty morale fell 
to abysmal levels quickly (Ravitch, 2010).   
Bersin’s term ended in 2002 and he left San Diego with mixed results (Ravitch, 2010).  
Ravitch continues her tale by recounting the rein of a mayoral-appointed leader of schools in 
New York City, Joel Klein.  Klein also had little experience in education and took a top-down 
business approach, eliminating checks and balances to improve speed (Ravitch, 2010).  He 
stressed testing and accountability making it the end-all through his district; schools and teachers 
were rated on their students’ test scores and how they changed (Ravitch, 2010).  80 percent of 
the teachers’ union members strongly disapproved of Klein (Ravitch, 2010). 
In 2009, Klein started putting more energy into charter schools, planning to open 100 
more than he already had and giving public school buildings to charter operators to help ignite 
that growth (Ravitch, 2010).  The concept of neighborhood schools eroded and the public 
schools grew bitter (Ravitch, 2010).  As neighborhood public schools were shut down, largely 
due to low test scores, their attendees scattered to surrounding schools, many over forty-five 
minutes away (Ravitch, 2010).  The least motivated students were lost in the shuffle as public 
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schools were closed and smaller charters were opened (Ravitch, 2010).  Unfortunately, the new 
schools were so focused on high test scores that they were not motivated to look for the lost 
students (Ravitch, 2010).  The students who were not lost but still not capable enough to get into 
a charter were forced into other larger public high schools, starting the process anew of 
depressing test scores and getting the school shut down (Ravitch, 2010).  Ravitch worries that the 
charter school movement will continue to harm America’s public schools in this downward 
spiraling way as the neediest students with the less motivated parents are the only ones left in the 
public system (Ravitch, 2010). 
Both Bersin and Klein were superintendents with a “get-tough,” top-down leadership 
style, focusing their energy on the new conservative choice and accountability (Ravitch, 2010, p. 
47).  These growing trends all have the same underlying idea: business principles –
accountability, competition, standards, quantifiable measures, efficiency, and large-scale 
reform—are the new best rules for running our school system.  The concept of school choice is a 
reflection of competition in business sectors that leads to better products and systems of 
production (Ravitch, 2010).  Standardized testing grew from the desire to hold educators 
accountable, measuring and standardizing their jobs and paying them based on how efficient they 
seem to be (Ravitch, 2010).  
Local reforms, including the EFM position and charters in Detroit, reflect this business 
approach to education.  The role is modeled off of the CEO position in companies in which the 
leader is given almost absolute autonomy and power.  Furthermore, the position is based on the 
premise that autocratic leadership is more efficient at making change and that financial solutions 
through business practices will improve the schools.  A common effort in Detroit to improve the 
district is to become more fiscally lean by cutting costs and consolidating the number of schools.   
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Ravitch (2010) writes that these business ideals grew from conservative factions of 
reformers with right-leaning ideologies but that now the movement is embraced by the nation as 
mainstream.  These movements are so powerful because, as both Larry Cuban and Ravitch agree, 
both the left and right have bought into them.  As Ravitch and Cuban also discuss, it is typical of 
a movement to be “infused with hype” and blindly supported, despite a lack of evidence showing 
that it will result in positive change.  I conclude that national movements are powerful because 
they are what is “in,” not necessarily because they are what is best for the students of 
America.  We need to realize that new autocratic, top-down, business oriented positions of 
control, and increased competition will not guarantee improvements.   
After examining these national movements, Ravitch and Cuban offer takeaways to 
protect future reformers for falling into the holes that past educators have.  Using the examples 
of San Diego and New York City, Ravitch (2010) cautions her readers about the negatives of 
top-down control.  One of the institutes commissioned to do research during Bersin’s reign in 
San Diego, found that teachers “who perceived decision making as being top-down tended to 
resist school-wide reform efforts” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 57).  In New York City, because mayoral 
control took power away from local and central school boards, parents found it difficult to 
communicate with school authorities (Ravitch, 2010).  Ravitch (2010) argues that speedy top-
down reform makes it hard to gain credibility, support, and objective review: three necessary 
pieces to creating support for reforms. 
 Klein’s strategy in New York City of warning schools of their low performance and then 
closing them if their scores did not improve did not result in “school-change” (Ravitch, 2010, p. 
87).  Cuban addresses the need to have a “school-change” strategy that changes classroom 
practices.  He knows that for a solution to work, it must improve what happens between 
! ##!
students and teachers (2010).  He offers a four-question method of assessing enacted reforms, 
which doubles as a guide to implementing reform (2010).  One of these questions is whether or 
not the reform has changed the content and practice of teaching (Cuban, 2010).  The current 
movements of increasing accountability and choice may change high school structures but do not 
automatically change what is done in the classroom and thus may not improve students’ 
academic performance (Cuban, 2010).  
Ravitch’s last important point, one that she brings up throughout her book, is that using 
more standardized testing and therefore creating more accountability, does not automatically 
translate to improved pedagogy (2010).  There are many pieces of a great education that are 
extremely important that cannot be measured by numbers, things like clean and safe 
environments for learning and committed, quality teachers and staff (Ravitch, 2010).  She makes 
it clear that using test scores to measure success is not complete. 
With these national movements and the resulting cautionary recommendations in mind, 
we will step forward to look at how these specific movements have played out in Detroit.  
Conversely, looking at the case study of Detroit in its past and present will teach us some 
nuances about these national movements. 
 
Detroit’s History 
Larry Cuban, in As Good As It Gets (2010), reflects upon consistent errors of urban 
educational leaders across the nation and places the blame for these common errors on 
reformers’ lack of historical knowledge.  Most policy leaders fail to recognize that the current 
state of our American education system and its individual struggling urban districts depends on 
the past (Cuban, 2010).  Historical trends and past patterns of behavior in educational 
organizations may be instrumental to reform (Cuban, 2010).  In this way, when we look at the 
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current situation in Detroit and think about possible solutions for the schools there, we should not 
overlook the history that lies beneath the surface. 
 In this history section, I aim to take the history that Mirel has shared and weave it into an 
abridged version intended for both the reader who wishes to learn about the interesting and 
potent past of Detroit’s public schools, and for the reformist who wants to learn from the 
successes and failures of past reforms.   Detroit’s history is filled with cautions and best practices 
that I will draw out and highlight in bold. 
All points from Mirel’s book The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System will have a 
page number following.  Other sources will be cited properly.  Uncited points are my own. 
1919-1929 
Throughout the 1920s, Detroit’s education system was “one of the finest in the world” 
(43).  The largest cause of this excellence was the consensus regarding the need for and the 
direction of the city’s education system (44).  Business leaders and organized laborers alike 
agreed on educational issues largely because both sides saw the schools as working in their favor 
(48).  For the laborers in Detroit, they saw the public schooling system as their own creation and 
protecting it as a part of their ideology (49).  The laborer’s constant vigilance was the only thing 
that would keep their school system out of the hands of the capitalists (52, 50).  While the labor 
factions saw education as an ideological means to change the existing structure of the economy, 
in the eyes of the conservative business leaders, the school system was a means to continue 
strengthening the established order (52).  Ideologically, these business leaders considered the 
roles of schools to be geared towards teaching patriotism and the virtues of capitalism (52).  As 
economically beneficial systems, “good” schools were those that best prepared children for the 
labor force (52). 
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 Even though socialists, union members, business leaders, and school officials all had 
different, contradictory reasons for their support, they nonetheless agreed on the need to expand 
their high-quality public school system (54).  The size and growth of the city’s school funding 
are evidence of this multi-dimensional support.  In addition to school enrollment growing from 
95,023 to 254, 645 students between 1918 and 1932, the city of Detroit also spent an additional 
$41.20 more per pupil in the 1931-1932 school year than in 1918-1919 (54).  This expansion was 
also noticeable in terms of the percentage of city revenue spent on schools, which changed from 
18% in 1914-1915 to 34% in the 1920-1921 school year (54).  These increased expenditures 
were supported through allocations made by the city council (54).  This implies that the political 
leaders of Detroit also supported public education in a major way, and that if they did not, they 
faced a hard wall of opposition (54). 
 Ample funding, although one way to measure support, does not always signify 
consensus, however.  Across the country, controversies regarding how money should be spent on 
schools were common (55).  In Detroit however, three key major money-spending measures 
went over smoothly.  Firstly, as the nation experienced declines in the number of new and old 
teachers alike and as Detroit teachers’ salaries fell in comparison to other professions’, Detroit 
experienced a teacher shortage (56).  Aforementioned support for the Detroit school system 
immediately led to substantial increases in teacher salaries and a new acceptance towards 
allowing married women to teach (58-59).   
 Secondly, even though the monetary cost of doing so was staggering, Detroit labor and 
business factions united in their demand that more schools be built to accommodate the 
increasing enrollment numbers (59-61).  From the 1917-18 school year to that from 1934-35, the 
number of students needing an education in Detroit almost tripled (60).  Overall in 1920-1921— 
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the peak year of teacher salary increases and the middle of the demand for more schools— the 
mayor and council doubled their allocation for Detroit schools, an increase of $5.8 million (58). 
While the public school system in 1917 consisted of 126 schools with eight under construction, 
the system was 222 schools strong by the year 1930 (65).   
Thirdly, broad consensus led to the continuation, rationalization, and bureaucratization of 
the progressive reform efforts set in motion by the school board from the previous decade (66).  
Although it was his predecessors who introduced IQ testing and tracking, the superintendent, 
Frank Cody, smoothly expanded these practices (68).  He introduced commercial, technical, and 
general learning tracks as a way to allow students to achieve the education best suited for their 
intellectual level (70).  The unanimity underlying the creation of these progressive policies—
both parties generally agreed with the national progressive movement headed by educational 
theorist, John Dewey—upheld the consensus between business leaders and organized laborers 
(67). 
In its Golden Age, the Detroit school system experienced the power of broadly based 
consensus in creating positive change.  This theme of broad support will come up again and 
again as one of the biggest and best practices in Detroit’s history.  Having support and 
consensus from many constituents is vital for implementing reform. 
Cody and his board also implemented the Gary Plan initiative.  Under the Gary Plan, 
schools operated on a rotating schedule, which meant sending two platoons of students to either 
the traditional half of the school or the half designated for an enriched program (72).  This 
allowed for the most efficient use of school space, time, and staff (72).  While this plan had the 
most current curriculum and was cost efficient, it was one of the most controversial programs of 
the time period (72).   
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A preliminary cause of the school board’s success with the Gary Plan was how slowly the 
board implemented it.  After evaluating the backlashes incurred by other cities who implemented 
the plan, they decided to only convert two schools into platoon schools the first year, two the 
second, and nine the next (73).  This board was wise to be attentive to the successes and failures 
of similar education reform across the nation in order to avoid common mistakes.  Not only can 
school districts learn from their own past, but from the experiences of other similar school 
districts. 
Before making any changes, the board allowed educators within these schools to choose 
whether or not to be involved with the initiative (73).  This ensured that involved educators 
bought into the program—buy-in being an important component of any comprehensive school 
reform.  These Detroit leaders also informed the public regarding their plans (73).  The 
superintendent, Frank Cody, spent much of his time on community relations and his efforts went 
a long way to ensure that the reforms were successful (68).   
Much of the communication with the community and educators was laced with research 
language.  Cody and his board framed the reforms as being heavily researched-based (68).  They 
assured the principals and teachers that no policy decisions would be made before researching 
and studying the schools’ results (73).  Using scientific knowledge to endorse educational reform 
is not only helpful for gaining support, but is necessary for ensuring quality reforms.  In Detroit’s 
case, when the district started spending large amounts of money on construction projects, 
criticisms arose regarding exactly how money was being spent and where (61).  The board 
responded quickly to these outcries by implementing research initiatives, which eventually 
discredited the criticisms (61-63).  Not only was this an efficient way to resolve immediate 
concerns, but the board acknowledged the concerns and used a research-based approach to look 
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into the matter.  The board showed accountability for its program and the program’s success, 
which should always be emulated by any education system. 
This example of success in new school reforms exemplifies and adds nuance to Ravitch’s 
best practices: move slowly with new reforms and research them.  Conducting and reporting 
objective research is an important tool for acquiring the credibility and legitimacy by 
which efforts gain support and buy-in. 
This was an important period in the history of Detroit.  It is considered the Golden Age 
for Detroit schools because every city faction agreed when it came to the education system.  
Importantly, each faction saw the schools as theirs—the system for which they were responsible 
and felt obliged to constantly monitor and protect.   
 
1929-1940 
In my interview with Jeffrey Mirel, he told me that after he wrote The Rise and Fall of an 
Urban School System, he realized that he had written a tragedy.  This may not have been the case 
if the Detroit school system had never reached the level of success that it did in the 1920s and if 
the following fall was not so dramatic.  Some argue that the Great Depression hit Detroit harder 
than any other city in the nation (89).  The effects included not only devastating unemployment 
but also the destruction of the previous decade’s consensus.  The Great Depression forced actors 
to come face-to-face with three large educational issues: reducing the education budget, 
adjusting to new enrollees, and organizing a teachers’ union.  By the end of the 30s, the different 
factions (laborers versus business owners) began disagreeing over education along the same lines 
that they previously divided down on political and economic issues (90).   
In the end, it came down to money.  As the Great Depression hit Detroit, the largest 
portion of the municipal budget was being spent on the school system (91).  As city debts 
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increased, the government turned to educational retrenchment as a partial solution.  On the side 
of the city government sprouted what was called the Stone Committee (91).  The Stone 
Committee was led by a banker named Ralph Stone and consisted of representatives from large 
business groups (91).  These businessmen advised the city on retrenchment issues, approving the 
city for bank loans if the budget was balanced (91).  Their demanding of a balanced municipal 
budget led these business leaders to pull back their almost unconditional support for the schools 
and instead demand huge spending cuts (91).   
Organized labor, liberals, and left-wing organizations standing by the board of education 
had been the allies of the Stone Committee but were now their fierce adversaries (93).  Divisions 
were largely along class lines: the business and right-wing factions wanted low taxes and low 
spending on education, while organized labor and left-wing groups fought for the opposite (93).  
What began in this Great Depression period as positions for or against retrenchment, a balanced 
budget, or social services began to turn into hardened political philosophies that would continue 
to split the different actors in Detroit (95).   
One of the biggest battles over the education budget was fought over teachers’ salaries 
(93).  The board’s decision to cut construction costs was one of the few retrenchment decisions 
that faced little opposition but these costs were only about 20% of the educational budget (93).  
Teachers’ salaries accounted for 75% of the 1929-1930 school budget and were accosted quickly 
(93).  The issue of cutting salaries was extremely controversial and salient (96).  The Stone 
Committee demanded reductions in the allocation for teachers’ salaries and after the school 
board voted against these reductions, threatened to take away the board’s control (94).  While the 
board of education began to grudgingly make cuts elsewhere in 1931 as it reeled under the 
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demands for less spending, these cuts did not yet breech teachers’ salaries until a year and a half 
after the Stone Committee’s threats (97).   
In 1931, board president A. D. Jamieson made a speech suggesting cuts in teachers’ 
benefits and the board approved the proposals unanimously (98).  Jamieson’s recommendations 
would save the district an approximate $800,000 (98).  Although none of the recommendations 
were a direct cut to wages, his proposal set the tone for prioritizing programs over salaries (99).  
In the next year, the school board tied its salary reductions to parallel those throughout Detroit 
(102). 
In the winter of 1933, things got even worse in Detroit.  Two of the city’s largest banks 
went under, further helping to cripple the city’s economy (102).  Unemployment may have 
exceeded 350,000 people (103).  Teachers and city workers received no salaries for two months, 
were paid in scrip following that, and then joined the relief lines (103).  An amendment limiting 
property taxes signified the likely loss of an annual $2 million to the Detroit’s public school 
system (103).   
However, the 1933-1934 year turned out to be the worst of the depression (110).  By 
1934, a large collection of interest groups and organizations had rallied behind the school board 
(109).  These socialist, left-leaning, working-class supporters fought strongly for the children of 
workers (109).  Their power and the declining prestige of businessmen throughout the city of 
Detroit after the bank collapses helped put an end to these attacks on the education system and 
largely halt budget cuts (109-110).  The successful refinancing of the city’s debt also helped 
(110).   
Through this time of lingering high unemployment, a new demographic of students 
enrolled in Detroit high schools (132).  These students, largely from poor or working-class 
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families, were seen in this time period as less academically and vocationally able (132-133).  
School authorities, in response, began offering some less rigorous high school classes for these 
students; by the 1940s, Detroit high schools were giving many of their enrollees a second-rate, 
general track education (134). 
Detroit’s schools’ new curriculum to keep these less academically talented students in 
school was another issue that split labor and business factions apart.  Labor unions, fighting to 
keep even their adult workers in jobs, were incentivized to fund the schools and their new 
general track, while business leaders already had a surplus of skilled labor and had little need to 
fund the public schools (134).  However, in less than a decade, business leaders began to feel the 
results of the lowered standards in Detroit high schools, and began complaining of the 
inadequate skills of their employment pools (135).  This was the beginning of concerns about the 
lower quality of public education in Detroit.  
Here we see, for the first time, the success or failure of Detroit being explicitly defined by 
the achievement of students.  Detroit, in the 20s was seen as one of the best in the country 
because of its successful implementation of national reforms.  During the Depression, the Stone 
Committee and other business and conservative leaders called the system unsuccessful because 
of its ‘non-efficient’ spending.  Later, the system and its reforms will be judged based on factors 
that have nothing to do with student learning.  The creation of the general track and lower 
standards is one of the most important changes from this time period.  The resulting negative and 
long-lasting effects, as we will see, remind us of the importance of teaching and learning, an 
obvious point but one that does get lost in the shuffle.  Just as Cuban reminded us before: we 
must measure reform in how it improves teaching and learning. 
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The reason that school systems as organizations frequently measure their success on 
factors besides students’ achievement is, as Chubb and Moe wrote, because they are controlled 
by a mass of actors that support the schools based on what the schools can do for them.  School 
board members as well as city officials that determine part of the funding for schools are voted 
into office and cater to these voters to retain their jobs.  The different groups of actors support 
the education system based on whether it keeps students out of the labor force longer, or reduces 
the budget deficit, or increases teachers’ salary. As a result of this structure of power, decisions 
made under these pressures may lead to negative consequences for students’ learning. 
For example, when the school board considered cutting teachers’ salaries, it faced strong 
opposition from non-student constituents who had their own agendas and goals.  Thus, the board 
decided to cut spending on maintenance and construction, which happened quietly because no 
one was there to oppose the measures.  These cuts, though, were the first in a 15-year period of 
decisions that entirely curtailed the physical expansion and improvement of the school system 
(99).  The severe consequences of the school board’s uncontested decisions would begin to show 
beginning in the late 1940s and would continue after that when students learned in poorly 
maintained, unsafe buildings, in classes of 40 children because there were not enough schools 
(99).  Even now, the poor quality of school buildings is considered one of the major challenges 
in Detroit schools (Moje).  This hindsight knowledge shows the importance of considering policy 
decisions based on more than who has a strong voice, arguing for or against them.   
 This is just a part of the difficulty of schools systems as organizations.  Their board 
members and stakeholders are not the direct recipients mandated in the organizations’ mission 
policies.  Reformers cannot forget the nuances that result from the nature and identity of the 
organization itself.  Amongst all this, it cannot be forgotten that schools are created to serve 
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the student, not the voters.  So although reforms are not supported or voted down by students, 
their effects must reach students by changing what happens in the classroom.  
This Great Depression time period was also an era of more freedom for teachers.  In 
1934, the newly created Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT) announced itself as an active 
union (117).  By 1936, they had proved their ability to successfully strike for what they wanted 
(119).   They became openly allied with organized labor, liberals, and school administration as 
they grew (120, 122) but were not as radical as many of their original critics accused (118).  By 
the early 1940s, the DFT established itself as anti-communist, a politically smart move (173).  
Although the union may have had liberally extremist views in earlier years, they worked 
diligently to eliminate this as a part of their identity.  The practice of removing the extremities 
in their organization’s identity, allowed them to gain legitimacy. 
A caution for current and future reform leaders is do not forget the foundation and 
history of the teachers’ unions.  The DFT is a powerful player in the current public school 
system and they draw this power, their goals, and their methods from their past.  Notice that the 
DFT was born in the wake of the Great Depression, a time of despair for teachers in which their 
strong voice and hand became necessary for solving some of their most pressing problems.  
These unions still play an active role in Detroit in the 21st century. 
 
1940-1949 
After the economic slump of the Great Depression came a World War II boom for Detroit 
(152).  By 1939, the schools’ operating budget was almost as high as it was pre-depression (129) 
but this post-depression recovery brought new dilemmas.   
 As military equipment for the war effort rolled off assembly lines, African Americans 
moved into Detroit in great numbers, doubling the populations of black communities which were 
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soon segregated from white neighborhoods (153).  The middle and upper class white families 
that made up the business groups in Detroit began relocating to the suburbs (154).  This only 
further reduced this socio-economic group’s desire to financially support the inner-city Detroit 
public schools (154).   
Within the school system itself, the school district was transforming their curriculum “in 
favor of vocational education” (157).  During the war, high school courses needed to pertain to 
employment in the military, employment in war industries, or serving the war as a civilian in 
order to be ‘practical’ (157).  The board still faced the financial demands of constructing 
buildings, hiring new teachers, and raising teachers’ salaries (158-159).  While the school system 
had not cut any programs, nor fired any teachers through the Great Depression, a positive, 
salaries had been cut and were now extremely weak in the face of new inflation (130).  Also, 
because of the hiring freeze and low salaries for teachers in Detroit, the city was facing a teacher 
shortage, one that left elementary and junior high classes with a median of 41 students (159).  
The decreased spending (by over 80%) for the past 15 years left existing buildings in need of 
repair (158).  On top of that, the migration of Detroit inhabitants to outlying sections of the city 
created a demand for brand new schools (158).   
After WWII ended in 1945, the school board found itself facing business leaders who 
opposed high taxes and a municipal government with little money to spare (161).  Business 
organizations began criticizing the school system for wasting money and lowering educational 
standards (163).  They thought that the schools were a poor investment because public school 
graduates in Detroit were not being adequately trained for even basic work (178).  The teachers’ 
unions agreed with many of those criticisms and denounced the platoon system and the general 
tracks in the high schools as the cause (178).  The conservative superintende
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Dondineau responded that this lower quality was due to the ‘less quality students’ that were now 
enrolled in the system (179).  At this point in 1945, the DFT had maintained little respect and 
cooperation with their school board, which did not increase wages or hire teachers (175).  A 
piece of their ill relations stemmed from the presence of Dondineau and his strong ties to the 
business community (175).   
In 1946, after the city provided the schools with considerably less money than they 
requested for another consecutive year, the board of education and its supporters backed a 
proposed constitutional amendment that designated one third of all state sales tax revenues for 
schools and local governments (164).  This amendment became known as the “sales tax split” 
and, when it was passed that year increased state sales tax revenue for public education (168-
169).  It effectively reduced the existing current inequalities in state aid, which was given 
proportionally more to rural districts (166).  This proposal and two other passed amendments 
were huge steps toward ending the lack of funds for statewide public education (170). 
The many groups that backed the board and fought to increase the school budget now 
pushed and pulled the board in opposite ways when it came to spending priorities now that there 
were available funds (162).  Parents demanded new schools while teachers cried for increased 
salaries and the board struggled to satisfy both needs (176).  In reaction to these growing 
tensions, A. D. Jamieson made a speech in 1947 very similar to his previous one in 1931 about 
the necessities of making cuts and the board’s plan to do so (180).  Even while the speeches 
looked similar, the situation was entirely different (180).  During the Great Depression, the board 
faced the Stone Committee while its supporters understood that cuts had to be made.  Now it was 
the liberal and labor organizations giving the board trouble (181).  This time these organizations 
were looking to get as much money as possible instead of lose as little as possible (181).   
! &(!
And now, for the first time in the history of Detroit, the teachers’ union announced a 
strike to get the spending that they wanted (162).  They militantly refused to accept lower 
salaries despite the fact that doing so would hurt others (181).  The DFT was not considering 
hiring more teachers and reduce class size and they were not considering students missing days 
of schools, since they eventually went on strike.  Here again we see a situation in Detroit’s 
history in which the loudest actors are those who are fighting for their own gains.   
By this point in 1947, the board had realized, because of parent involvement as well as a 
consciousness of the current needs of the system, that maintenance and construction cannot be 
forgotten (185).  However, it was faced with a dilemma: not completely fixing schools buildings, 
or not completely giving educators what they want.  Their response, to compromise, only 
backfired (183) because they did not realize the full extent of the DFT’s resolve.  Here may be 
the time to remind reformers: do not underestimate the determination and the goals of each 
player.  To do this requires policy-makers to understand that different stakeholders may be 
looking out for themselves and not the students.  Reformers cannot simply assume that other 
actors only have students’ best interests in mind.   
Let this situation also be a reminder that a lack of money is not the sole cause of dissent 
and disagreement within a system.  The school system had more funds overall at this point 
than during the Great Depression but this did not lessen the city’s division.  The political fighting 
that began during the depression persisted and grew in the present day.  Money can help heal 
problems, as will be shown shortly, but points in history like the one above should remind us that 
money is not the only factor to blame when things turn sour.   
The teachers would have gone through with their threat to strike if not for an additional 
$2.5 million offered to the schools from the city the day before the proposed strike (183).  This 
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allowed the school board to pay teachers what they demanded, while still having money to begin 
rebuilding the rest of the system (183).  By 1948 however, the main concern was again the acute 
need for funds to construct new buildings and maintain the old ones (185).  This need was 
apparent and most parties understood that the school board needed the freedom to issue bonds 
and propose millage (property tax) increases (186).  Legislation to give the board those powers 
was passed in 1949, partially because the city realized that it would be better for them and their 
budget if the school board was accountable for the finance and results of the schools instead 
(186).   Financial control was given from the mayor, council, and interest groups to the voters 
(186).  This was extremely important for the board of education and the whole school system: 
now they depended even more directly on the desires of the people. 
The first campaign the school board put in front of voters was a tax increase of 2.5 mills.  
On the same ballot, three school board members were up for reelection (and their opponents 
looking to take their spots) (199).  This vote was especially exciting and groundbreaking because 
a new constituency played a part: the black community (196). 
By 1944, the NAACP in Detroit was the largest chapter in the nation (186).  Even before 
this time, there was growing evidence that the schools in Detroit were becoming increasingly 
black and increasingly segregated as black families were restricted to certain areas and school 
board policies sorted black students into certain schools (188).  These policies included unequal 
resources and facilities given to certain schools with large numbers of minority students (188), 
employing black faculty at numbers much lower than the percentage of black enrollment (less 
than 4% compared to 17%) (190), white staff putting a larger percentage of black students in 
special education and general track classes (191), moving populations of racially alike students 
to certain schools when there was overcrowding (193), and allowing students to move out of 
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schools with large numbers of minorities (188).  The black community began to get involved in 
the school system in the 40s, hoping that the schools would play a major role in decreasing 
segregation and racism (190).  Their priorities lay in improving buildings (over increasing 
teacher salaries) because the schools serving the largest black populations were the oldest and 
needed the most renovations and because board policies in response to overcrowding led to 
increased segregation (192-193).   
Unfortunately, again, the school system and suggested reforms were not being framed by 
how they help students achieve.  Just as the teachers’ goals were their low salaries, now black 
parents’ were poor buildings and large class sizes.  These factors clearly do affect learning, as 
Kozol2 would show you in detail or any teacher would likely argue, but it is never mentioned in 
parents’ arguments how they affect learning.  Instead the building and class conditions were 
measures of inequality, not learning.  This hurts the system; not only reformers but activists and 
voters should also realize the distinction. 
The black activists joined the white liberals and labor leaders to create what Mirel called 
the “liberal-labor-black coalition,” jointly seeking more liberal policies and programs for the 
schools (195).  This coalition is the one that plays a huge role in educational reform for the next 
few decades in Detroit.  Just like the coalition of business and labor factions during the 20s in 
Detroit, the liberal-labor-black coalition is another example that coalitions of voters are 
powerful in creating education change in Detroit. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&!Jonathan Kozol wrote Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools in 1991.  The book 
presented the shocking educational inequalities based on race and class that are present around 
the country.  He profiles the schools and communities in six different locations explicitly 
showing his readers the horrible learning conditions that these children have to deal with and 
which no outsider seems keen on improving.!
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As the decade came to a close there was a feeling of possibility and unity that resulted 
from this new coalition (200).  But the era as a whole constituted a decline in the quality of 
Detroit’s schools.  This decline came not from the obvious issues of buildings or salaries, but 
from the watered-down curriculum that aimed to teach all students, especially minorities and 
working class students, practical courses that were assumed to be best suited for those students 
and the war (202). 
Again, the school system had survived the past decade by eventually giving the loudest 
parties what they needed while ignoring the pieces of the problem for which no one was fighting. 
During the Great Depression, the board flirted with the Stone Committee and the teachers, while 
cutting funding for building maintenance.  In the 1940s, it dealt first with the state and its lack of 
monetary aid, then the stubborn teachers’ unions, then the liberal-labor-black coalition while 
ignoring the poor curriculum that spread through the schools.  These choices were not only the 
effect of loud players who had the ability to push and pull the school board (with control, money, 
threats, or votes) but a national movement that belittled the abilities of poor and minority 
students while stressing the importance of the war.  As we leave the 1940s behind, let us reflect 
again on the fact that national movements are not necessarily what is best for our children.   
 
1949-1964 
1949 through 1964 was a period marked by the emigration of young, white, middle-class 
families from Detroit to the suburbs outside of the city (220).  With them, went the city’s 
manufacturing jobs, local property tax base, and public education’s political backbone (219-220).  
They left behind a segregated city and a larger percentage of younger African-Americans (29%) 
who were generally poorer but had more children (56% of the students attending city public 
schools) (219-220).  The majority of Detroit’s population now clustered around being either 
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under twenty or over fifty years old; elderly voters began to have more of a say in school millage 
and bond issues while school enrollments increased (219-220). 
The era was also characterized by a change in power alignments as the liberal-labor-black 
coalition worked to gain control of the schools (217-218).  In 1955, the first black candidate was 
elected for the school board and five of the seven board members were backed by the labor 
coalition (226).  This board’s only hiccup came when the members started having meetings 
involving multiple school administrators, teachers, and university professors, while not 
informing superintendent Arthur Dondineau (226).  When their existence was leaked, the “secret 
board sessions” were called a ‘plot’ of and against certain factions and became front-page news 
for almost six weeks (226).  While the actual effect on the board and their proceedings was weak 
(228), the quick and dramatic reaction to the “secret meetings” reminds us that transparency 
between board members and the board (as well as other governing and decision making 
bodies) and the community is extremely important.  
As the liberal-labor-black coalition strengthened its hold on the school board, it also 
focused its efforts on expanding, improving, and funding the public school system (229).  After a 
millage increase in 1949, the system began hiring teachers and started a construction project 
(229).  Two years later, it was clear that the new money and efforts were not enough to address 
the deteriorated existing school buildings as well as the need for new buildings and teachers in 
growing districts (229).  The system needed more money to solve problems that had been 
plaguing the system for decades (229).  This could have been a pivotal moment for Detroit’s 
education system: the newspapers along with the major civic and labor organizations supported a 
millage increase.  Disappointingly, the board succumbed to pressure from the Board of 
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Commerce, the only prominent critic of another tax increase (and all tax increases at that), and 
only put a millage increase of two mills (instead of the wanted 2.5-6 mills) to voters (230).   
By the time the board got around to proposing a 3 mill increase in early 1957, there was 
no longer a consensus of support and almost 60 percent of voters turned down the appeal (234).  
Of course it is difficult to berate an organization for not pushing for more when the time is right, 
since we do not know if the consensus would have held just as well for a larger original mill 
increase, etc.  But accepting an increase that would not cover its needs, even in a time of positive 
public opinion, hurt the board’s overall effectiveness at raising funds.  The Board of Commerce’s 
role in the situation is also very upsetting in their situation-blind criticism of tax raises and in 
how the board’s quick yielded to it.  Mirel, in this chapter is pessimistic, writing that “even the 
strongest political movement could not arrest the deterioration” of Detroit (218).   
Without the second funding increase, the school system fell into a state of crisis (234).  
The board failed to get any emergency funds and as a result had to cut spending on construction 
almost in half (234- 235).  The teachers’ union demanded that any remaining funds should be put 
toward salary increases as inflation increased (235). They urged the school board to put all first 
graders on half-day sessions to free up money to give teachers’ a raise (235).  When they did not 
get these salary increases, hundreds of teachers left for the suburbs and the teacher shortage in 
the city grew severe (235).  Again, this was an instance of the teachers’ union putting teachers’ 
needs first, but it is hard to tell which decision by the board—refusing or allowing a salary 
increase—would have helped students more.  
Amidst these crises, the system was beginning to realize that even if the education system 
had enough safe buildings and enough teachers to put students in small classes, a large 
percentage of these students would still be receiving a second-rate education (239).  The 
! -)!
commercial, vocational, and general tracks had been supported up until now, even while they 
continued to lower the systems standards (237).  Previously, school leaders had thought less 
academic classes were necessary to keep all students in school, but even while these tracks had a 
strong presence in the school system, only about 60% of students were graduating from high 
school (235).  Along political lines, liberals argued that the school system needed more funds to 
diversify curriculum and create more social welfare programs (236).  Conservatives fought 
against new taxes and wanted the system to return again to teaching the traditional basics (236).   
Hearing these loud concerns from the community, when the school board looked for a 
new superintendent to replace Dondineau that year (1958), it chose someone willing to accept 
input from community groups (239).  The new superintendent Samuel Brownell created the 
Citizens Advisory Committee on School Needs (CAC) to survey all aspects of the school system 
and recommend changes (239).  The CAC investigated the curriculum, personnel, buildings, 
school-community relations, and finances of the system and concluded by calling for an overhaul 
of the curriculum (240).  This change, just like solving the building and teacher shortages, 
required a huge increase in funds for the schools (241).  Unfortunately, a large piece of the 
advice the CAC offered on how to improve the curriculum was in favor of vocational and 
general courses in order to keep all students in school (242).  The CAC did recommend that the 
school system strengthen the highest-level tracks simultaneously, but their report ignored the 
poor education a third of Detroit students were receiving (242). 
As a result of the CAC’s suggestions and warnings, even the business community got 
behind the committee’s recommendations including their need for more funds (242).  There was 
little opposition and the board quickly passed a 4.5 mill renewal, a 3 millage increase, and a $60 
million bond approval by large margins (244).  The school district, even while the revenue from 
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the millage increases would continue to decline as property assessments declined, was in the best 
financial shape since the 1920s (244).   
There is much to learn from this period of distress and calls for change.  The problems 
and proposals though which the school system cycled are very similar to those of the 21st 
century: funding is lacking, buildings are eroding, teachers are upset, and students are receiving a 
poor education or none at all.  From here on out, Mirel’s history sounds very much like a book 
on current reforms and we should keep our eyes open to see what our predecessors have tried 
and which of their efforts failed or succeeded.  
One thing to understand from this is how deeply rooted Detroit’s current problems are.  
They have been building through the 1990s.  Thusly, we cannot forget and assume that our 
solutions can only be skin deep.  Next, I think that creating an advisory committee to survey the 
largest aspects of the school system is a best practice.  Opening the issue up to research and 
input from community members introduces new non-partisan, student-minded options and 
gains the support of the community.  The CAC’s recommendations and the following inflow 
of support and money through the system were large factors in the success of racial changes in 
Detroit.   
One of the CAC’s strong suggestions was that the school board and other leaders should 
improve relations between the Detroit school system and the black community (254).  At the 
time of the CAC’s recommendations, more focus had been turned toward racial issues in Detroit 
schools (251).  As more blacks moved into Detroit, aligned their missions with the spreading 
civil rights movement, and allied themselves with the labor-liberal factions, the existing racial 
inequalities in Detroit began to be addressed.  Black Detroiters were successful in improving 
existing schools and building new ones in black neighborhoods, increasing the number of black 
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faculty in Detroit schools, ending the policy that segregated black faculty in black schools, and 
improving the quality of instruction and curriculum in black schools (251).  With steady pressure 
from the black leaders (and their liberal allies), and promises from the schools board, the board 
spent 75% of its total construction costs from 1959 to 1962 in areas with the largest proportions 
of black students (254).  By 1961, the percent of black teachers had increased from 5% in 1949 
to 22% of the total teaching force in Detroit, one of the highest rates in the United States (254, 
255).   
In terms of improving the teaching of black students in the city, the black community was 
conscious that black students were not taught the same curriculum, partially because schools 
were persuading black students to aim for vocational goals instead of going to college and were 
putting black students in lower tracks more frequently than white children (255).  The black 
community also contended that Detroit educators needed to understand that educating poor, 
black students required different teaching strategies than they typically used to teach their other 
students (256).  An important factor in making these pedagogical changes was an extremely 
successful project called “Great Cities School Improvement” which worked with teachers and 
parents to standardize methods of teaching based upon children’s previous life experiences 
(257).  The program began in Detroit and spread around the country (257).  Detroit had become a 
leader in race relations (258). 
The only aim of black groups that was not realized was stopping the administrative from 
manipulating attendance boundaries in order to further segregate schools (262).  The CAC report 
found that racial segregation of schools existed and was harming black students (263).  As 
certain black factions became passionate and militant about the need for desegregation, working 
class white families were voting against it (265).  The labor-liberal-black coalition did not agree 
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on this issue and factions of both white voters and black voters began to withdraw their support 
from the school system for opposite reason: some blacks wanted more change, while some 
whites wanted less (265).  This was a huge problem for the school board, which had collected a 
$6 million deficit by 1963 and needed to go to voters to get more funds (266).  White voters 
increasingly refused to increase their taxes for a school system that was largely improving 
majority black schools (267); black voters did not want new funds to go toward increasing 
segregation (268).  For the first time, the majority of Detroit students were black, while the 
majority of voters were white and large numbers of working-class whites were abandoning the 
liberal-labor-black coalition (270).  The only strong support for an important millage increase in 
1964 came from the Board of Commerce who now realized that the collapse of the school system 
would harm the Detroit’s economic viability (268). 
The school board, here, needed to chose its goals then be absolutely transparent about 
where funds would be used.  Not picking a side, not saying anything meant that it got little 
support from either faction.  What happened to the charismatic leaders, the published research 
and reports, learning from others? 
 
1964-1981 
Through this time period, Detroit was in an accelerated tailspin into economic and social 
devastation.  Unemployment, crime rates, segregation, and the number of black and poor 
residents increased dramatically (295).  As residents grew poorer and property value fell 
drastically, keeping the school district afloat required higher and higher rates of taxation, rates 
that were hard to get voters to support (297).  By 1980, 86% of students were black (297), 
estimates of black unemployment were up to 40 percent (296), and black residents were growing 
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angry and frustrated with the too slow change in the school system.  There seemed no end in 
sight to the educational and societal inequalities that they were facing (299). 
In 1966, a Detroit school became the site of walkouts, rallies, and demands, not from 
teachers or administrators but from students (301). They demanded improving the school in part 
by removing principals, and they stayed out of school long enough for the school board to get 
involved (302).  The board ended up recognizing the concerns of the community and met the 
students’ demands (304).  Unfortunately this legitimized the students’ actions and set a precedent 
which polarized the community: white voters now thought the board was too weak to stand up to 
black students, while more black families and students began to boycott their own schools (304-
305).  A part of the black community continued to get more militant, wanting “black power” 
instead of integration (309).  In the wake of the Detroit Riot on July 23, 1967, black nationalists 
argued that the only solution would come when the “black community controlled it own schools” 
(312). 
 A research committee, created by the school board after the first high school student 
boycott, studied the condition in every Detroit high school (304).  It offered up two major 
changes: the decentralization of administration authority in the system and increased 
accountability for teachers (328).  A key to both was increased parental and community 
involvement in their schools (328).  Decentralization became an increasingly supported reform 
not only because it would decrease the anger of the community as well as the anarchy of the 
students, but it was also a reform that did not cost money (330).  The change would hopefully 
restore authority in the schools, the lack of which was due to conflicts over personnel, symbols 
of black nationalism, and verbal and physical violence within the schools that had grown out of 
control (331).  Another factor that lead to a successful campaign for decentralization was the 
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publication of Detroit test scores: 80% of students scored below national norms and every school 
with majority minority students scored below grade level (335).  
 By July of 1969, both houses of the Michigan legislature passed a bill created by 
Coleman Young, a Lansing Democrat, dividing Detroit into seven to eleven regions with their 
own nine-member board (337).  A central board elected from the city at-large could overrule, 
modify, or affirm the decisions that each regional board made (336).  The first debate after 
passing the bill, was over how regions should be split, who would control them, and what agenda 
these new regional boards would take (338).  The entire debate had its foundations in the debate 
over segregation versus desegregation (338).   
 While the existing liberal board members still had its say, they wanted to continue their 
goal of integration and they drew boundaries that created integrated regions and mandated high 
school desegregation (339).  This was an extreme proposal that exceeded the requirements of the 
current decentralization law (339).  This board, passionate about its goals, ignored the lesson that 
has developed across this history so far: maintain your most mainstream identity in order to 
gather the largest support.  In this case, its extremist position pushed all white voters and some 
black voters as well against it (341).  Coleman Young denounced the board for turning public 
opinion against his decentralization bill, which the Michigan legislation quickly repealed (342).  
Young created a new bill, this time ending the school board’s plans for desegregation (342-343).  
The governor split the eight new school districts along racial lines; giving four regions to the 
black community even while black students were the majority in every region (343).  In the end, 
white candidates won most of the seats across the boards (346). 
 The radical black backlash to this new more modest desegregation plan turned to the 
courts (344).  The U.S. Supreme Court decided that desegregation could take place only within 
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the city limits of Detroit (346).  Unfortunately for this initiative, only radicals supported it and 
for political reasons (344).  William Grant in 1971 said, “at no point during the debate on 
decentralization was education the prime consideration” (344).  Most black families at this point 
just wanted the best education for their children and believed that that could be achieved by 
getting more teachers into well-funded and orderly schools (345).  The issue of desegregation 
took attention away from other educational issues (346).    
Busing in the city also intensified both white and black Detroiters’ opposition to most 
liberal reforms and any tax increases (356).  Facing a lack of support for any increase in funds, 
the school system’s deficit exploded from $3.5 million to $20.3 million from 1969-1971 (347) 
and in 1972, Detroit school leaders prepared to shut down the entire school district (351).  The 
only reason that this did not come to fruition was because of state funding requirement changes 
that forced city residents to increase millages to support the schools (352- 354).   
  The city began the costly busing desegregation initiative in 1976 and by 1989, busing 
ended quietly (413).  From its conception throughout its lifespan, it was a cause of white flight 
and general opposition to supporting the schools (358).  In review, we can list the factors that 
contributed to the horror that was busing.  It was an initiative only supported by the extremities 
of constituents, the radicals.  These supporters did not stop in the face of a general lack of 
support, even while their efforts were financially costly.  Their motivations were political instead 
of student-centered.  They pushed many black and white residents, the center of the voter pool, 
away, further breaking up liberal-labor-black coalition, which meant that future collective efforts 
lacked collaborative support.   
 As the smoke of busing cleared, the discord of decentralization was obvious.  Competing 
interest groups only agreed on the importance of accountability which pitted them all against a 
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teachers’ union that did not want the boards to be able to remove “poor” teachers and principals 
(360).  The public wanted to remove some of the power held by the DFT while increasing the 
power of the community even more yet (360).  Teachers worried that accountability would be 
based not on whether a teacher could teach but on whether the teacher had certain political or 
racial ideologies (361).  In 1973, the DFT asked for a pay increase equal to the increase in cost of 
living (362).  The board agreed to the pay raises if the DFT agreed to an accountability plan: the 
two parties had finally come head to head (362).  After neither side budged, the DFT began the 
longest strike the Detroit school system had ever seen (363).   
By this point the school system seemed to be broken into two factions, there were no 
alliances, no collaborations, no middle grounders.  It is important to understand that this 
divisiveness made it extremely difficult for cooperation and positive change to be made.  We 
have discovered from this historical tale how important it is to focus on the middle grounds, to 
get different groups to support your position, while removing extremely radical identities.  
We have seen examples of successes, and failures to do this, and the positive and negative 
results.  But now we have two different factions at the extremities that are locked in conflict.  At 
this point in conflicts, the two factions need to realize the most important goal—improving 
the education of students in the classroom—and understand the differences in where the 
others are coming from in order to come together to reach that goal.  The teachers needed to 
see that the decentralized boards stood the best chance of truly making change for the good of 
students, but the board needed to realize the fear and sacrifices that the teachers had made in the 
past, and the reasons for their near obsession with protecting their jobs.  The boards, if they were 
advocating for the students and the community, should have made it clear to the teachers that 
their accountability plan would only terminate teachers based on their teaching practices, not 
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teachers’ beliefs.  These considerations should have been clearly defined in the new plan, if both 
separate factions had a hope of closing the gap between them. 
The stalemate between the union and the boards only ended when the governor set up a 
statewide panel to study accountability and report back with guidelines on how to evaluate 
teachers (364).  Finally, the governor had reached a middle ground through, as we have seen as a 
best practice, his move to get an objective examination and solution that multiple parties can 
trust. 
Decentralization had broken whatever relationships had existed before, and motivations 
were more about politics, pride, and race than teaching students (368).  Through the mid-1970s, 
there had been “near anarchy” throughout Detroit schools (366).  Student violence, vandalism, as 
well as teacher absenteeism were raging (366).  Student test scores, already below the 45th 
percentiles, dropped into the twenties (366).  By 1981, there was little interest in the 
decentralized system anymore and Detroiters voted to recentralize the system (368).   
Here we not only see the importance of the many best practices that we have already 
identified (and the devastation that comes when we ignore them), but we see the beginning 
stages of the national movements discussed by Ravitch and Cuban entering the scene in Detroit.  
We see, although not exclusively, two initiatives through the 60s, 70s, and 80s: one for 
decentralization and one for teacher accountability.  Both the failure of decentralization and the 
increased support for accountability are factors that spurred on the transition to centralized top-
down control, lack of union power, and dependence on standardized testing.  The initial 
initiatives, lets not forget, were for community power: for the community to control the schools 
and hold teachers accountable, while the environment in 2012 has no focus on community input.  
Something went wrong in this transition to community control: something on which we should 
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attribute part of the current situation.  As Walter McLean would ask: what went wrong in our 
past that lead us to need what we now have?   
The way I see it, the desire for community control sprouted from a public feeling that the 
majorities’ desires were not being considered: in this period, most students in Detroit were black, 
as were their families, but the paths of communication favored white residents: most voters were 
white and most district administrators were white.  In response, the community did what they 
could to get their voices heard: they rallied in the schools.  They thought that they should be 
controlling their schools. 
Unfortunately, the reform did not aim to comply with these specific needs.  Instead the 
board and certain radical black factions used it as a move toward desegregation, while the state 
split the decentralized boards in such a way as to still give whites disproportionately more 
leadership positions.  By this point, consensus and coalition were gone and the only initiative left 
was the hope to keep teachers accountable to the needs and desires of the community.  We will 
see how community control over teachers, turns into the present day top-down control of the 
teachers’ unions.  As historians, let us keep our eyes open as we progress in history.  As 
reformers, lets make sure that the outcomes of our initiatives match up directly with the 
original goals of that change.   
 
1981-1999 
 Through this period, graduation rates remained around 50% and those students who 
graduated did so with few basic skills and an average ACT score of 14 (413).  Issues with 
discipline were still a daily part of the everyday school experience (414).  The financial strife 
that characterized much of the schools system’s history was deepened by the recession during the 
1980s (416); even while black Detroiters supported millage increases all through the 80s, this 
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was not enough to keep the school system from running annual budget deficits (417).   White 
voters, despite being in the minority, still played a dominant role in state government and city 
media (417).   
Neither the state nor the DFT helped the schools reduce the deficit and the media blamed 
the school board entirely for financial troubles, which Mirel says is “neither entirely fair nor 
accurate” (420).  This may be a good time to remind readers not to forget that the media has 
immense power over public opinion and can cause huge success or damage for education 
reformers.  Throughout his history, Mirel comments on the opinions propagated by various 
media sources and the ways in which they strongly affected public opinion. 
The largest initiative of this period began in 1988 when the school board was swept with 
the candidates representing a new reform called the HOPE campaign (621).  The HOPE 
members advertised an “education revolution” and financial stability (421).  Specifically they 
wanted to empower schools and create schools of choice (422).  Their plan for raising money 
was very similar to the previous board’s plan, but the HOPE leaders had the confidence of the 
public (423).  This confidence grew out of the alliance that the HOPE campaign represented, a 
type of alliance not only between the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) and many civic 
and grassroots organizations, but the DFT, the Chamber of Commerce, and the media as well 
(420).   
 The alliance between and public support for these diverse organizations led to a passing 
vote on a millage increase that brought fiscal stability to Detroit schools and with it an 
opportunity for new change (423).  In 1991, they boldly moved forward with their plans to 
empower schools and create choice (423).  If large percentages of a school’s faculty, students, 
and parents voted in favor, their school was “empowered” which, defined by HOPE, meant that 
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faculty and parents controlled basically every aspect of how their school ran, including 92 
percent of their budget (424).  The system’s central administration would then only monitor 
whether the school balanced their budget and met academic standards (424).  The hope was that 
the schools system bureaucracy would become more efficient and individualized (425).   
 The new changes did not come without opposition, however.  The strongest resistance 
came from the powerful DFT who refused to let any of their members vote to empower their 
school (426).  The DFT thought that the practices of schools picking their own teachers and 
selectively raising teachers’ salaries, eliminated fairness and teachers’ job protection (425).  
After a strike, the DFT triumphed with a resulting contract that reduced the power of empowered 
schools, took teacher matters out of contest entirely, and gave them new salary increases that 
sucked up the previous feeling of financial security (427).  Even after a four-year term of a 
balanced budget and improved test scores and graduation rate, the HOPE board members were 
criticized heavily by the DFT and had lost their confidence (428). 
 Here is another a reform that stressed community control and accountability, but was also 
a shift toward choice and competition.  These were business approaches to accountability that are 
closer to our present day initiatives in Detroit.  And in the end, it was the community control 
aspect of the HOPE reforms that failed, mostly due to its conflict with the teachers’ unions.  
Mirel argues that the DFT, at this point, was “not interested in following the lead of… its fellow 
locals, or its original commitments,” a harsh but realistic assessment (430).  The union’s 
obsession with defensively facing each and every opponent head-to-head instead of trying to 
work with them made new proposals difficult to discuss, try, and make successful (431).   
The board leaders were at fault because they should have understood the struggles with 
the unions in the schools’ past, foreseen this stubbornness, and recognized their legitimate 
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concerns for retaining jobs and security (432).  The HOPE team should not have assumed that 
the DFT would cooperate to create change.  The DFT’s power should not have been 
underestimated and the board should have known that without the DFT’s partial cooperation, its 
task was nearly impossible (430).  To get the support of the teachers, the board should have 
pushed its pedagogical concerns instead of its political ones (432).  Moving forward, leaders of 
education reform, especially in Detroit, cannot ignore the power of the teachers’ unions or 
expect cooperation.  On the other hand, the unions need to be willing to be more flexible and 
open minded in order for the cooperation necessary for the betterment of the school system 
(433).   More communication, understanding, and cooperation from both sides could have made 
this hopeful reform reach its full potential. 
 
1999-2002 
In 2004, Mirel wrote a piece called Detroit: There Is Still a Long Road to Travel, and 
Success Is Far from Assured about the events in Detroit’s school district after the HOPE reforms.  
Mirel’s piece focused on, as the title suggests, a new school government system of mayoral 
control.  From here, it will be easy to see how Detroit is building up to EFM control.   
 As the 1990s were ending, approximately 80 percent of the Detroit school district’s 
funding came from the state (Mirel, 2004).  With this, the state gained more control on the state’s 
school districts (Mirel, 2004).  As individual districts had less and less power, they could no 
longer ask voters for millage increases in response to teachers’ unions’ demands (Mirel, Detroit).  
The Republican-controlled state legislature further diminished unions’ power when they passed a 
new law in 1994 that fined unions and individual teachers for every day that they strike (Mirel, 
2004).   
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This is a crucial shift in Detroit, partially as a backlash to the failed initiatives to give 
Detroiters more community control over their city’s schools.  Not only was it the failed attempts 
at decentralization and empowerment that led these changes, but a deep financial problem that 
the school system struggled to deal with on its own.  School finances have played a large role in 
Detroit up to this point, but they will only become even more influential in changing specifically 
who is making reform and how.  These struggles and failures help us understand the reasons 
behind the increase in state control and decrease in union control, which are large aspects of 
education reform in Detroit today. 
This increase in state control and a decrease in the power of the previously strong DFT 
grew out of a stalemate situation in which factions could not unite and create change.  After the 
HOPE campaign attempts, it seemed that there would never be enough cooperation and 
collaboration to help solve the schools’ problems.  As a result of these weak coalitions, it was 
easy for the state to gain more control.  This shift in control has changed the essence and power 
of the previous “coalition.”  In this resulting situation, which only becomes more top-down as we 
progress toward present day, cooperation and widespread community support is no longer 
needed to make change. 
The leadership structure of Detroit’s public schools began to explicitly change in 1999, 
when the state of Michigan, targeting Detroit schools, passed a bill that gave mayors the power 
to appoint new school board members and the school superintendent (now to be called school 
‘CEO’) (Mirel, 2004).  Through the 1990s other state governments had begun directly getting 
involved in restructuring failing schools, or giving that power to centralized figures (Franklin, 
2003).  These state “takeovers” were justified in four ways: one, widespread opinion thought that 
local school boards were inefficient bureaucracies, two, there were growing demands for 
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structural reforms of public schools, three, a growing belief was that certain mayors would have 
the will and skills to fix urban schools, and four, as a way to improve financial and academic 
accountability (Franklin, 2003).  The bill in Detroit, Michigan Public Act 10, received general 
support from Detroiters because the widespread sentiment was that the current administration 
and schools were not teaching their children and improving the system (Mirel, 2004). 
The bill was inspired by and modeled after the similar Chicago school reform bill that 
was passed in 1995 (Mirel, 2004).  The Chicago mayor appointed Paul Vallas who had a 
background in finance but was new to education, to the new position of CEO (Mirel, 2004).  The 
following five years brought financial stability and higher student achievement, news of which 
clearly made its way to Detroit (Mirel, 2004).  In Detroit, the new board was seven members, six 
appointed by the mayor and one by the governor (Mirel, 2004).  This board then chose who 
should fill the role of CEO although the mayor could fire this CEO without cause (Mirel, 2004).   
The change was the result and solidification of an alliance between a black Democrat 
mayor, Dennis Archer, and a white Republican Governor, John Engler (Franklin, 2003).  Both 
Democrats and Republican House and Senate members voted for the bill (Mirel, 2004).  Even 
though top-down control diminished the need for widespread support, collaboration at the state 
and administrative level is still needed. 
It was uncertain if Republican Engler and Democrat Archer agreed on educational 
ideologies of the mayoral takeover (Franklin, 2003).  Instead their collaboration likely reflected 
the public discontent with the local school board and its lack of action and results (Franklin, 
2003).  The Detroit newspapers, which supported the mayoral takeover, also were concerned 
with the effectiveness of school governance (Franklin, 2003).  It seems that this decision was 
made with little consideration of the educational decentralization and centralization movements 
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and the pros and cons that came along with them (Franklin, 2003).  These pros and cons 
concerned checks and balances of the system (Franklin, 2003).  Centralized, state control could 
more efficiently introduce higher standards through the system but could limit local community 
efforts to improve the schools (Franklin, 2003).   
At this point in time, Michigan and Detroit have been influenced by national movements 
for standards and efficient business control, but they have not truly identified and agreed upon 
the underlying ideologies.  The pros and cons of state centralization will become more explicit as 
history progresses, as will those of reformers’ buy-in to the national education movements.  No 
matter what the underlying causes were, these changes were extremely powerful for Detroit at 
that time and still are in how they shaped the leadership structure of Detroit today.  The role of 
Emergency Financial Manager has aspects of this CEO position within it.  The fact that the 
position was created to spark top-down change and action, that it was created as a business 
position, and that Chicago’s model succeeded with a CEO who had no background in education 
but improved the district’s financial system, have all shaped the position of Emergency Financial 
Manager today.   
In 1999, the reform board offered David Adamany a one-year interim CEO position 
(Mirel, 2004).  Adamany had a strong and long background in education although he was white, 
worked in academia, and had never worked in public schools specifically (Mirel, 2004).  He 
immediately began setting an agenda to addressing the schools’ problems with truancy, large 
class sizes (of 35-40 students), and promoting students through the grades even when they were 
not performing at grade-level (Mirel, 2004).  These issues were clearly ones that effected student 
learning, always an important goal.  Some of Adamany’s efforts to help students, including a 
merit pay system for the highest performing schools, and removing teachers and administrators 
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from failing schools, ran counter to what the teachers’ unions wanted (Mirel, 2004).  Union 
members decided to strike and although Adamany could have used the new bill from 1994 to 
penalize teachers, he did not (Mirel, 2004).  He refused to set the board against the teachers, 
compromising with them even though he could have forced them to accept his reforms, and in 
the end both groups got what they wanted and the schools opened again (Mirel, 2004).  Even 
though the system no longer needed strong cooperation to change (Adamany could have 
followed through with his initiatives and ignored the unions), it is clear that cooperation 
balances the system, making reforms pass more agreeably.   
In the end, Adamany’s willingness to work with the unions was not enough for him to 
still want a system in which they had full power.  Before his year was over, Adamany got a bill 
passed through the Republican-weighted state legislature that abolished unions for school 
principals and administrators (Mirel, 2004).  He wanted to be able to weed through poor 
administrators in order to let the quality principals have more control in their schools (Mirel, 
2004).  In 2000, after this bill was passed, the school board chose a new replacement CEO, 
Kenneth Burnley who had experience both in Detroit and education (Mirel, 2004).  As Mirel 
concluded his piece on mayoral control of Detroit schools in 2004, Burnley was settling into his 
role as CEO of the schools. 
 
2002-2012 
In our interview, Mirel indicated that he did not know of a single major work on Detroit 
education after this point.  And thus, although I did research that pales in comparison to his 
holistic study, the facts and data following are of my own finding.  The following narrative will 
present the major historical events up until February 2012.  Along with best practices, it contains 
an increased focus on the business approach consuming the district.  The issues of the 
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Emergency Financial Manager position and charter schools will be extremely salient.  From the 
shift to state takeover and mayoral-control, to the resulting position of EFM, the importance of 
accountability, standards, and efficiency are constant.  Charters are typically connected with 
privatization, outside contracts, and the CEO/business control of the schools in the following 
history.  As the charter movement grows, sentiments about them will change even as they remain 
consistently tied to the new leadership of the schools. 
In the beginning of the last decade, Detroiters’ feelings toward charters were icy.  In 
December of 2002, a philanthropist named Robert Thompson announced that he would give 
$200 million to build 15 charter high schools in Detroit.1  Thompson had given millions of 
dollars to the city and people of Detroit in the past, and was clearly passionate about improving 
schools.2  He spent nine months crafting a state bill that would lift the charter school cap.3  
Lawmakers passed the bill in August of 2003.4  Before Thompson could put his money into 
effect, however, his gesture became involved in a huge political debate with Detroit Public 
Schools and the community.5  Part of the problem came from the public opposition to charters at 
the time.6  The problem was more acute because Thompson wanted to charter his schools and not 
let Detroit Public Schools do so.7  At that time, Kenneth Burnley responded that only schools 
chartered by DPS were doing as well as the public schools according to performance scores.8  
Even though Burnley held the business CEO position, he was not entirely open to letting new 
charters in at this point in time.9   
By the end of 2004, approximately 42 charter schools were operating in the city of 
Detroit, some of them for-profit.10  DPS union representatives cried that every child who left 
Detroit Public Schools for charters took their state enrollment money with them out of the school 
system.11  This is a paradox with charters that remains prominent in Detroit: even as business 
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leaders, as we will see, use charters as a way of reducing their budget costs (such as maintenance 
and operation costs of buildings, and salaries for teachers), charters at the same time take more 
students from the public system, thereby reducing the budget income. 
 For example, in an effort to retain students, the Detroit school system decided in February 
of 2005 to no longer issue waivers to allow students living in Detroit to attend other districts.12  
Meanwhile, a bill in the state legislature authorized the creation of 15 new charter schools in 
Detroit in 2003 and by 2005, another bill to lift the cap was before the House education 
committee.13  This increase in charters was, according to the liberal Michigan Quarterly Review, 
“the worst that could happen to the crisis in the Detroit Public Schools.”14  In their minds, the 
option of having choice should be cared about only after the public schools were helped.15  The 
public school system lay in direct opposition to charter schools. 
 The tale of charter schools will continue in parallel to that of the EFM, which begins 
where Mirel left off.  Kenneth Burnley was still CEO of the mayor-controlled schools.  During 
his time as CEO, Burnley made it a priority to get parents involved.  He created an Office of 
Parent Community Liaisons to bridge the gaps between the schools and parents.16  This office 
took an active role in helping to keep their enrollment numbers from falling.17  New programs 
through DPS taught parents how to prepare their children for school.18  By 2004, every Detroit 
school had a parent group.19  Burnley urged parents to “wrap their arms around the children” and 
help prepare their students for learning by doing things like attending parent-teacher conferences, 
feeding children well, and getting children involved in after school activities.20     
The projected shortfall of Detroit Public Schools the 2003-2004 school year and the next, 
$78 million and $91 million respectively, caused Burnley to start laying off 900 of the existing 
9,000 teachers and scaling back on other expenses.21  The fiscal deficits grew mostly out of the 
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enrollment decline in Detroit schools, almost 17% in the past eight years amounting to losing 
$211.8 million in revenue.22   
In this time of cut back, the lines were again drawn along labor and business.  Some news 
articles commented that Burnley was “doing a good job in the business community but not in the 
neighborhood.”23  The Michigan Chronicle, a business journal, made its support for Burnley 
clear.24  On the other hand, Labor factions from Detroit pointed fingers at contractors who were 
not city residents, arguing that privatization took money from the schools and jobs from Detroit 
laborers.25 
Some parents and publications blamed the debt on the “school takeover,” mayoral control 
in other words, and the fact that parents did not have a voice through the ability to elect a school 
board.26  Community members blamed Burnley for the deficit, especially since the school system 
had a surplus of $83 million in 1999.27  A new liberal coalition, Keep the Vote No Takeover 
(KTVNT), demanded the removal of Burnley and the appointed school board.28  In their 
recommendations to reducing the Detroit schools’ deficit, they wanted to sever ties with outside 
consultants and corporations who were using the system for their own financial benefit.29  They 
also demanded that money given to charter schools, $12 million that year, should be given 
rightfully to the public schools.30  The DFT sided with these protesters.31  These school activists, 
backed by strong support from the Michigan Quarterly Review, a publication of liberal articles, 
demanded new checks and balances and more scrutiny and community control of Burnley who, 
the Michigan Quarterly wrote, “has operated in a totalitarian manner since the Republican 
operatives… seized control of the schools and hand picked him.”32  
Over the summer of 2004, the mayor, Governor Jennifer Granholm (D), and the 
Michigan legislature created a new board election plan to be voted upon by Detroit citizens in 
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November: If this Proposal E was passed the school would remain under the control of a 
mayoral-appointed CEO to be approved by the board. 33 Detroit’s mayor at the time, Kwame 
Kilpatrick, supported the proposal and said that he would keep Burnley in his current CEO 
position if it were passed.34 
The lines over who supported Proposal E and who fought it tooth and nail were drawn 
again down their previous lines.  The mayor and the Detroit Chamber of Commerce supported 
Proposal E, among others.35  The Michigan Chronicle “unequivocally support[ed] the measure” 
writing that Burnley deserved more time than just four years to continue his plans for Detroit.36   
In opposition, KTVNT and other community and citizen groups, Detroit pastors, and the 
Detroit National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) created a 
coalition “Just Say No to Proposal E,” demanding that the system revert back to the voter-elected 
school board.37  Under the stress of this relatively new state and business pushed top-down CEO 
governing Detroit’s schools, the liberal-labor-black coalition was again uniting.  Their power 
may have been limited by the system, but in the face of a city vote the strength of coalitions was 
again prevalent.  This group helped defeat Proposition E by a margin of 65-35 in November of 
2004.38  The system would revert back to the eleven-member board in November 2005.39  
 As the issue on the November 2004 ballot subsided, worries about the district’s deficit 
grew.  The deficit was high not just because of declining enrollments, but because spending 
trends did not decrease in parallel.40  Governor Granholm approved a loan for $210 million for 
Detroit to cover the $198 educational deficit that school year.41  This measure was only a 
temporary loan and would little help the future financial situation in Detroit.  To plan for the 
future, Granholm created a transition team to work through the schools’ finances.42  The team, 
chosen in January consisted of between 120 and 160 community, union, and religious leaders, 
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educators, Detroit’s NAACP branch members, representatives from the mayor’s office, and 
representatives of Detroit’s legislature.43  The new transition team decided not renew Burnley’s 
contract, ending his employment in June 2005.44  They also left the budget crises to be left with 
Burnley and his replacement, instead splitting into eight different committees that focused on 
other aspects of improving the system and helping the students.45  In the beginning of Burnley’s 
last year, he announced a five-year plan to close 110 schools, almost half of the district’s 252 
buildings, cutting 5,400 employees, but saving $380 million.46  It was approved by the state in 
March.47  
DFT, union, and community protesters resisted closing schools and cutting jobs, but most 
vehemently protested privatization, money toward charter schools, and outsourcing.48  In 
response to the Deficit Elimination Plan, almost all of the district’s unions and the schools’ 
administrators accepted some wage and benefit cuts, but the DFT, by late August, still had not 
accepted the cuts, threatening to delay the start of school.49  The 11.4 percent wage cuts would 
set Detroit teachers back to 1999 wages.50  Narrowly avoiding a strike, the DFT and the school 
board, with the help of the transition team, settled on a contract that did not cut teachers’ pay but 
required teachers to loan five days’ pay to the district during the 2005-2006 year.51  The 
settlement came from a clear commitment from all sides to avoid a strike.52 
On July 1, 2005, William Coleman III became the CEO of Detroit schools.53  He had a 
30-year history working in public education, holding lofty financial and operating positions in 
New York, San Francisco, and Dallas schools.54  He clearly had experience with school finances, 
the first time these skills had been stressed in a leader of Detroit’s schools.  After he was in 
office for less than a year he had both liberals and conservatives standing behind him.55  The 
Chronicle, the business oriented newspaper that urged the board to keep Burnley, wrote a piece 
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on how Coleman should be given the permanent CEO job.56  He was liked for his aggressive 
marking plan to retain Detroit students, his new plans to fight the still raging violence in 
Detroit’s schools, and his communication with parents, students, and faith-based groups.57  
In late 2005, the community banded together, Detroit’s business leaders, the Detroit 
NAACP, the newspapers, even the liberal KTVNT, to vote yes by more than a two-to-one 
margin for a millage increase that brought a yearly $95 million into the schools.58  The 
collaboration was proof that, in the words of CEO Coleman in his thanks to the community, 
“most people in this city care about the education of children.”59  In November, for the first time 
since 1999, Detroiters voted for which school board members they wanted.  In March 2006, the 
elected board offered Coleman the “superintendent” position for another year.60 
The cycle of closing schools and cutting jobs continued into 2007.  Fifty-two schools 
were slotted for closure in 2007 due to 60,000 empty seats.61  The DFT went on strike at the 
beginning of the school year for 16 days, causing even more students to flee the schools and the 
cycle to continue.62  The teachers returned after collaboration with the school board, both 
factions sacrificing for the financial sustainability of the system.63  The school board closed 
buildings depending on housing patterns and the conditions of the buildings, while some 
community members wondered whether which schools were closed could and should be decided 
upon based on their academic achievement.64 
 In March of 2007, the school board fired Coleman after he lied about his familiarity with 
a technology vendor and gave that company part of a $58 million deal, even though they were 
not the best suited for the job.65  He received the rest of his $225,000 salary for that year due to 
his contract.66  Connie Calloway was appointed as the new superintendent in March of 2007.67  
Calloway left her position as a superintendent of a small district in Missouri to take the position 
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in Detroit.68  In September 2008, Kilpatrick, Detroit’s mayor, resigned, plead guilty to two 
counts of obstruction of justice, and spent 99 days in prison.69  By December 2008, the school 
board fired Calloway.70  The district had to pay the rest of her contract as well.71 
The board cited that Calloway was “insubordinate” and “uncooperative”72 with the board 
and “exercised poor judgment and unprofessional behavior.”73  The board and Calloway blamed 
the other for the state decision made in late 2008 that Detroit was in a financial emergency.74  
Mike Flanagan, superintendent of public instruction, head of the state board and department of 
education, determined that there was a financial problem in the school district big enough to 
warrant help from the state government.75  Detroit Public Schools had a $130 million deficit and 
no plan to overcome the shortfall.76  The school board blamed Calloway’s lack of leadership 
since she did not develop school improvement plans.77  Calloway in turn argued that the board 
was simply using her as a scapegoat for the district’s already existing problems.78  She pointed 
fingers at its own lack of transparency and honest financial dealings.79 
According to a state public act called the “Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act” 
that was passed in 1990, if the superintendent determines a serious financial problem, the 
Governor of Michigan is required to appoint a team to review the financial condition of that 
district, which Flanagan did.80  The outside review team spent thirty days deciding whether a 
financial emergency existed and thus whether an Emergency Financial Manager needed to be 
established.81  The Detroit school board could agree on a deficit elimination plan agreement with 
this review team in order to establish that the district was not in a state of financial emergency.82  
An EFM was a last resort, Flanagan said.83 
That December of 2008, Flanagan announced that the deficit plan and some other 
documents that the Detroit board submitted were unsatisfactory.84  By January, Flanagan was 
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recommending Emergency Financial Managers for Detroit schools.85  By the end of the month, 
Granholm appointed Robert Bobb, the CEO of a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm, the 
former city administrator and deputy mayor of D.C., and former president of the board of 
education there.86  The state senate consented to the appointment.87  Granholm commented that 
“Robert has the ability to get the Detroit Public Schools’ fiscal house in order so the district can 
devote its attention to ensuring that every students receives a quality education.”88  He was given 
a salary of $260,000 to get the job done.89 
One Detroit newspaper, Crain’s Detroit Business, sang Bobb’s praises: they commented 
on his realism that “the house [was] on fire and he [had] to be starting with a bucket of water on 
the front door,” his dedication to Detroit Public School’s mission for the children of Detroit, and 
his confidence.90  He was clearly already getting the media on board and he began urging 
“business, big and small” to get involved.91  Although Bobb was new to Detroit, he learned a lot 
quickly.92  
 Immediately, Bobb established a core team dedicated to the finances of the schools, 
including a chief financial officer, a chief of staff to handle grants, and an entire office to handle 
the district’s internal audits.93  Within a month, his team found financial irregularities in the 
budget, causing them to have to increase the budget deficit estimate by over $100 million.94 
 A few months later, Bobb announced that he would be revitalizing and revamping the 
Detroit Public Schools Foundation, a nonprofit created in 2003.95  He received some initial 
grants from individuals and corporations and planned to use the money as seed money for this 
new endowment and development office.96  Bobb’s goal with the foundation was “to assist the 
Detroit Public Schools by providing a secure source of private funds necessary to ensure that the 
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Detroit Public Schools may achieve its educational objectives for the benefit of its students, their 
parents, its employees, and the community at large.”97  
 Even with these efforts on Bobb’s part, a bond request on the ballot for November 2009 
was Detroit’s last effort to save its school district from filing for bankruptcy.98  Detroit Public 
Schools had an accumulated deficit of  $276 million and an expected debt of over expected $130 
million in the 2009-2010 school year.99  For some, bankruptcy seemed like the best option: it 
would allow for Detroit Public Schools to entirely rebuild, lowering its debt and reworking 
contracts and collective bargaining agreements with the DFT.100  The district did not accept 
bankruptcy though, requesting a $500.5 million bond to renovate almost all of its schools, 
schools that were on average over 50 years old.101   The bonds were no-interest and low-interest 
stimulus money that President Barack Obama made available to modernize existing schools.102 
Voters passed the $500.5 million bond.103 
These funds were a part of the 2010 budget developed by the finance team to eliminate 
the current-year debt and reduce the standing one.104  The plan also designated closing 29 
schools and laying off almost 18% of the currently employed work force, about 2,451 
employees.105  As the beginning of the school year neared, 33 principals had already been let go, 
72 administrative positions were cut, and 2,500 teachers, aides, and counselors had to reapply for 
their jobs.106  
Bobb reported that with the plan “at least our facilities would be available for 21st century 
teaching and learning.”107 Although there seems to be no change in pedagogy that comes along 
with this plan, and supposedly about the same ratio of students per teacher, Bobb may be 
referring to the fact that this plan would attempt to keep Detroit Public Schools running.  The 
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plan seemed like a moment-before-death necessity to create some type of future for Detroit 
schools at all.   
The biggest focus through this period—starting long before this bond proposal, but 
growing even more obvious after it—was on the financial aspects of Detroit schools.  This 
reflected the fact that finances were pivotal to the existence of Detroit Public Schools, but it may 
have also been a reflection of the national trends in favor of bringing business practices into 
educational organizations.    
Not only had the largest newspapers reporting on school issues become very business 
oriented but the topics even they discussed had turned, by the end of 2009, largely to the 
financial goings-on of the school district.  Discussions of financial fraud, of new bonds through 
private companies and ones backed by the state, real estate deals, advantages and disadvantages 
of bankruptcy… The developments focused public attention of the finances of the schools, while 
more and more ignoring the pedagogy and the results in student learning.    
The trend was also one of favoring Bobb and his business expertise.  Crain’s Detroit 
Business praised Bobb as they reflected upon the year 2009.108  It applauded how he and his 
assembled team shrunk the physical and financial size of the district, cutting schools and jobs.109  
The newspaper praised how he investigated fraud and ran financial audits, “finding millions that 
had been misappropriated or embezzled by employees… and millions in savings.”110  Alongside 
many of these praises for Robert Bobb was acclaim for Mayor Dave Bing as well.  The duo 
seemed like business partners fighting to fix the schools’ finances and turn the schools around.  It 
seemed conducive to reform that the two believed in the same things and supported each other to 
make those changes.  Bobb reported that he “considers himself a part of Bing’s Cabinet.”111   
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This confidence in Bobb and his financial doings even began to spread as some saw the 
opportunity for Bobb to increase his power over academics as well.112  For these business papers, 
Bobb’s success with finances led them to conclude that “Bobb and his team have earned the right 
to roll out their academic plan.”113  This, in the wake of student test scores that were Detroit 
Public Schools’ worst in their history (less than 15 percent of public school students were 
passing the math or reading portions of the Michigan Merit Exam),114 almost parallels the 
argument from 1999 for mayoral control of the schools: what we have is not working.  In this 
case, though, mayoral control and an EFM had already been in place since 1999.   
Detroit stakeholders, including the president of the DFT, also supported Bobb’s 
continued leadership in the wake of these academic failures because they blamed the consistent 
leadership turnover and the effect: no traction, sustainability, or progress.115  As Bobb’s contract 
came closer to expiration, Detroit again considered mayoral control as an option, this time to 
create stability of leadership.116  Mayor Bing supported mayoral control along with many of the 
newspapers, Governor Granholm, and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan himself who also 
saw it as a solution to almost constant administrator turnover.117  
In Cuban’s book (2010), he lays out some ‘common errors’ in urban school reform and 
offers his advice.  One of the topics he addresses is successions of reforms and reformists (2010).  
He argues that the cycle and recycling of urban educational leaders leaves school systems weak 
and ineffective (2010).  While frequent new superintendents may seem progressive, most new 
ones wipe out the little gains or foundations for gains left by their predecessor (Cuban, 2010).  
Even when individuals try and make transitions smoother, the sustainability of existing reforms 
usually still suffers (Cuban, 2010).  
! =,!
When addressing this issue of instability, Cuban (2010) brings up another trend that 
began in the 1990s to lay weak, uneven layers after layers of reform.  He commented that since 
the 90s, as leaders agreed that standards-based curriculum, testing, and accountability led to 
success, they begin implementing these reforms at a pace that was impossible to maintain (2010). 
Therefore, most efforts are not sustained and educational personnel get burnt-out as a result of 
the quickly moving cycle of new efforts (Cuban, 2010). 
One of the reasons this cycle of reforms happens is because money for these fad policies 
is plentiful (at least this is what Cuban argues) because of the loud national rhetoric and acclaim 
(2010).  Thus creating these reforms is easy even while the continuation is difficult (Cuban, 
2010).  Playing out in Detroit, educational foundations from Michigan and around the U.S. began 
to give more money to Detroit’s schools and Bobb’s business ideas.118  One of the national 
foundations, the Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, paid $84,000 toward Bobb’s salary over two 
years and over $183,000 to DPS to fund financial audits.119  Many different foundations also 
began donating money toward the startup and continuation of Detroit charter schools.120  This 
contrasts the fight against Bob Thompson’s attempt at spending millions to improve the charter 
network in 2002.  A major factor in this difference is the presence of Bobb and Bing and their 
acceptance of the national charter school trend.  As the relationship between Bobb and Bing 
grew, as discussed previously, the pair began to include all types of schools, including charters, 
in their discussion of the school system, making the idea of charters more mainstream and 
acceptable.121  In this case, as Bobb and Bing embraced the business style of addressing 
education, funders embraced them. 
By this point in late 2009, there were about 60 charter schools in Detroit, and the number 
was growing.122  Since Detroit Public Schools’ enrollment fell below 100,000 students in the 
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2008-2009 school year, Flanagan said that it cannot be considered a First Class School district 
anymore and he removed the cap on charter schools in Detroit.123  Through this time, Bobb 
continued his trend of privatizing services to outside contractors, actions that evoked anger and 
frustration from the city unions.124  
In this same time period, a new coalition based around national business standards was 
forming.  Local foundations and other educators, parents, and community organizations joined 
together to create Excellent Schools Detroit.125  Excellent Schools Detroit wanted to build 70 
new high schools by 2020 and to help get 90% of Detroit students graduating from high school 
and then enroll in postsecondary education or training.126 
Excellent Schools Detroit agreed that business leaders were the best for the job of 
replacing the schools.127  They suggested mayoral-control and called for high citywide 
educational standards in Detroit.128  Annual report cards would assess school performance and 
failing schools would be closed and replaced.129  They supported new state legislation that asked 
the lowest-performing schools to create a turnaround plan as well as the one that opened the state 
cap on charter schools.130   
School competition because of charters brought transformation, they said, but they did 
recognize that the current charters in Detroit were not doing much better than the public 
schools.131  For seemingly the first time, the community addressed all types of schools in Detroit.  
This holistic look at education reform added to the sense of cooperation and collaboration in 
Excellent Schools Detroit, as well as symbolized a shift in accepting of charter schools as a piece 
of education with which to work instead of stand against.  
Soon enough, in mid-2010, an outgrowth of Excellent Schools Detroit began a petition to 
get mayoral control on the ballot.132  Although the preferences of the business and foundation 
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communities were clear, and those of Governor Granholm were the same, the state legislature 
said that it did not have the power to change the governance model of Detroit’s schools.133  
Instead, they announced that voters should be the ones to make the decision to switch to mayoral 
control.134  People who signed the local petition were generally fed up with the school board’s 
lack of success in improving Detroit’s schools as well as the constant instability of 
superintendents (there had been four since 2006).135  These problems were blamed on the 
board.136  Signers also argued that the board was “faceless” and hard to keep accountable.137  
They wanted an “elected official they [could] hold responsible” and planned to do just that by 
replacing the current system with one in which the mayor would be help accountable for the 
appointment of a superintendent of schools and an advisory board of community-level 
members.138  They based their hopes for mayoral-control off the success stories from Boston and 
New York that had public schools systems led by the mayor since 1991 and 2002 respectively.139  
The issue never reached the November ballot box because the group did not bring the petition to 
the city council by the deadline.140 
Excellent Schools Detroit seemed to be the first collaboration, mention even, of teachers 
and community members alongside of the business community and foundations.141  Instead of 
uniting around a common goal while having different stances on education, as happened many 
times before the 21st century, this was a coalition united on identical educational values.  
Excellent Schools Detroit collected around national business ideals: accountability, standards 
and measurable goals, and transparent performance information, all to help parents “shop” for a 
good education for their children.142  This illustrates what Ravitch wrote, that what had been 
considered conservative, became a nationally agreed upon position.  
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We have moved from a system of state-imposed leadership in order to control the Detroit 
schools, their finances, and their unions, to a system of business-oriented leadership that feels 
less overbearing.  Both systems of control are equally state run without paths of input from the 
community, but the difference is in the stance of those voters.  The community now supports the 
values and theories behind the national choice and standards movements. 
Within this environment in the beginning of 2011, the state approved Bobb’s new deficit 
plan called the Renaissance Plan.143  To save $75-$99 million on maintenance, capital, and salary 
expenses, the plan detailed turning some of the 142 public schools into charters.144  Bobb created 
a list of 45 Detroit Public Schools that would either be closed or changed into charters.145  He 
said that this would improve his original idea of simply closing all those schools, which would 
have been a continuation of the closures of 60 schools in the past two years and likely resulted in 
some class sizes skyrocketing to 60 students.146  In accordance with the plan, Bobb’s office 
began accepting bids from charter school operators from around the country, hoping to find the 
“best, proven school operators” to run these “Renaissance” schools.147 
In May of 2011, newly elected Governor Rick Snyder (R) appointed Roy S. Roberts to 
follow in Bobb’s steps, whose contract was to expire in June.148  Roberts’ background is entirely 
business.  He told me, in our interview together, that he had “been in corporate America for 45 
years, with Leer Seigler, General Motors, to the top of organizations.”  He worked up the ranks 
at General Motors to become the Group Vice President for North American Vehicle Sales, 
Service and Marketing.149  At this time, Rick Snyder passed the Emergency Manager law 
legislation that allows emergency managers to sell public assets, make appointments, make and 
break contracts, and dissolve collective bargaining agreements.150  Due to this law, Roberts has 
full control over not only finances but academics as well (including the school board).151   
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 When Roberts was appointed, he was in charge of a district with over $327 million in 
debt.152  Immediately, he began closing $200 million of the deficit by turning short-term bonds 
into long-term notes.153  His financial plan also included reducing that much in spending by 
reducing salaries by a uniform 10% and laying off teachers to parallel the continuous drops in 
student enrollment.154   
Roberts’ biggest new initiative so far, just being defined and developed, is called the 
Education Achievement System, or EAS.  I spoke to Roberts on this topic in the end of February 
2012.  The EAS is a going to be a statewide program that operates the lowest performing 5% of 
schools in Michigan: “schools that have failed for a minimum of three years in a row by our 
standards” (Roberts).  Beginning in the next school year (2012-2013), its goals are to make those 
5% of schools into financially and academically stable schools that prepare students to “compete 
in a global workforce.”155  
Roberts is the chairperson of the Education Achievement Authority (EAA), or the group 
of people in charge of the EAS (Roberts).  He works with Rick Snyder in the EAA and the hired 
chancellor, John Covington from Kansas City.  In describing the EAA, he told me, “there’s a 
committee I work with of eleven people, an executive committee of five, and I have to make sure 
I manage that whole process.”  According to Roberts, the EAA is going to “put more money, 
more effort, more energy behind these schools.  [We’ll] probably be able to select some of [the] 
teachers.”  The EAS wants to make its schools look different from traditional public schools.156  
When Roberts and Snyder selected Covington they said, “We want you to think innovatively, 
creatively.  And over all [Covington’s] talking about meeting a child where the child is, and 
moving that child one year in one year’s time. Maybe no grades.  When a kid can master what 
they’re supposed to know in that grade, they move on to the next segment.  You have to use a lot 
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of technology in doing this. So any teacher that would be teaching kids in this kind of 
environment, they’d have to be able to use technology” (Roberts). 
This final initiative, built on the ideals of top-down leadership, working around teachers 
unions, and thinking outside of traditional schools, shows that the district and its leadership are 
still enveloped within the business movement of education.  
 
Conclusion of Detroit’s History 
In almost a century, Detroit’s schools have changed drastically.  The district has seen 
extreme times of financial bounty and starvation, populations come and go, coalitions unite and 
break, unions rise to power then fall, innovation and true devastation.  These ups and down, 
successes and failures, have taught us invaluable lessons with which we can build future reform 
to restore the education system of Detroit.  The history has shown us how reforms must be based 
on student-oriented goals.  To gain support for these initiatives actors need to transparently 
research them and make sure that they appeal to large groups of constituents in order to gain 
legitimacy and support.  Even with collaboration, there are some problems in Detroit that have 
been growing for the decades that skin-deep solutions will not fully address. 
The next sections will continue this history, examining how Roy Roberts dealt with 
Robert Bobb’s plan to create more charter schools, as well as how Roberts has acted differently 
than Robert Bobb as the new EFM.  The following sections are based on the interviews of people 
working within the present education system instead of solely based on archival sources.  As 
such we will gain deeper insight on and understanding of Detroit’s schools’ current state.  We 
will see how the takeaways from the past play out in Detroit’s current reform initiatives and 
these current initiatives will also show us how the national business movements have flourished 
in Detroit.   
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Interviews on Current Detroit Education Reforms 
Methodology: Field Study 
Based on consultation, I identified people with expertise and experience with Detroit 
Public Schools to interview.  This search began by speaking with my adviser and emailing 
people he knew through his connections at the School of Education at the University of 
Michigan and through the Higher Education- DPS Consortium.  The Consortium is a 
collaboration between seven universities from Southeast Michigan, including the University of 
Michigan, that works to improve education and reduce inequalities in Detroit Public Schools.  
After reaching out to this initial group of people for interviews, I reached out to a second group 
that the former had suggested to me.  
From November 2011 through January 2012, I interviewed ten different adults who were 
or are involved in education reform in Michigan.  They represent various positions within the 
system of education reform, some working directly with Detroit Public Schools, some working at 
the University of Michigan, and some in other capacities. 
Every interview was conducted and the audio of every interview was recorded with IRB 
consent.  Two out of the ten interviewees requested to remain anonymous: both ‘Rebecca Platte’ 
and ‘Vienna Williams’ are pseudonyms.  Every interview started with a brief description of my 
thesis and an inquiry of how the interviewee was involved in Detroit or education reform.  Each 
was then asked about what they believed to be the biggest challenges in Detroit education today.  
I asked about the charter school push and the role of EFM as plainly as I could to avoid any of 
my own biases in the questions.  They were usually phrased as such: “For my thesis, I also am 
looking at the current role of Emergency Financial Manager in Detroit.  What are your thoughts 
on that position?”  I never had to elaborate on what either the EFM or charter schools were; 
however, in some interviews I mentioned Roy Roberts’ and/or Robert Bobb’s name.  
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Additionally, I asked each interviewee what solutions they would suggest for the education 
system in Detroit.  In every interview, I followed up on many of the aforementioned framework 
questions.  I concluded the interviews by asking for further contacts or supplemental material to 
read.  
 
Interviewees’ Basic Information 
Table 1: Interviewees 
Time of Interview 
Location of 
Interview 
 
Length of 
Interview 
Current 
occupation 
Relevant past 
experiences 
Current 
affiliations 
  
January 24, 2012 
Math Lab, 
University of 
Michigan 
Nkem Khumbah 
 
1 hour, 13 
minutes 
•Faculty in the 
Comprehensive 
Studies Program 
at the University 
of Michigan 
•Was a part of the 
discussions that 
eventually 
became the 
Consortium 
 
January 14, 2012 
Tabernacle 
Missionary 
Baptist Church, 
Detroit 
Walter McLean 
 
40 minutes 
 •Was a teacher 
and principal for 
K-12 in Detroit 
•Worked in the 
Central Office as 
one of twelve 
Executive 
Directors 
(assistant 
superintendents) 
over Detroit 
schools from 
2000-2001 
 
November 21, 
2011  
Jeffrey Mirel 
School of 
Education 
Building, 
University of 
Michigan 
•Professor at the 
University of 
Michigan School 
of Education 
•Historian 
 
•Wrote The Rise 
and Fall of an 
Urban School 
District and 
Mayors in the 
middle: politics, 
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 34 minutes  race, and 
mayoral control 
of urban schools 
 
December 7, 
2011 
School of 
Education 
Building, 
University of 
Michigan 
Elizabeth Moje 
46 minutes 
•Associate Dean 
of the University 
of Michigan 
School of 
Education 
•Studies 
adolescent 
literacy 
•Creates teacher 
professional 
development 
programs at the 
University of 
Michigan  
•Worked in 
Detroit for 25 
years, specifically 
on professional 
development 
 
 
December 19, 
2011 
Albert Kahn 
Building, Detroit 
Irene Nordé 
54 Minutes 
•Head of the 
Detroit Public 
Schools’ Math 
department 
 
•Worked in Math 
education for 30 
years inside and 
outside of the 
Detroit district 
(including in 
charter schools) 
•Past teacher, 
administrator, and 
university 
instructor 
 
 
December 12, 
2011 
Ann Arbor Public 
Library 
Rebecca Platte 
32 minutes 
•Works for a 
nonprofit focused 
on reform 
evaluation 
 
•Past teacher 
•Experienced 
with reform 
throughout 
Michigan 
 
December 2, 
2011 
Tabernacle 
Missionary 
Baptist Church, 
Detroit 
Jerry Rankin  
1 hour, 46 
minutes 
•Reverend at 
Tabernacle 
Missionary 
Baptist Church in 
Detroit 
•Works with 
students in math 
using programs 
he has created 
 
•Grew up in 
Detroit 
•Follows a 
religious mission 
to help students 
succeed in math 
•Has been 
working with 
students in 
Detroit for 26 
years 
•Member of 
the 
Consortium 
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January 31, 2012 
Fisher Building, 
Detroit 
Roy Roberts 
23 minutes 
•Emergency 
Financial 
Manager 
•Chairperson of 
Education 
Achievement 
Authority  
•Business 
background 
 
November 30, 
2011 
School of 
Education 
Building, 
University of 
Michigan 
Laura Roop 
41 minutes 
•Outreach 
Director at the 
University of 
Michigan for past 
11 years 
•Former 
Communications 
Director at the 
University of 
Michigan 
•Present for the 
creation of the 
Consortium 
•Member of 
the 
Consortium 
January 27, 2012 
An elementary 
school in Detroit 
Vienna Williams 
1 hour, 2 minutes 
•Teacher in a 
public Detroit 
elementary school 
•Has been a 
teacher for 15 
years 
•Grew up in 
Detroit 
•After getting her 
teaching degree, 
decided to return 
to Detroit 
•Member of 
a teachers’ 
union in 
Detroit 
 
Interviewee Analysis 
The people I interviewed provided me with insight on the current situation in Detroit, on-
the-ground opinions about the current reforms, and suggestions from people actively involved in 
either Detroit or education.  To further delve into this insight from my interviewees, I 
categorized each person and analyzed their responses.  Below, I have categorized them in two 
ways: the first based on their vantage point, the second on their educational stances.  The first 
category depends on what role they have (or may have had) in education.  Each role has a 
varying degree of distance from Detroit Public Schools.  The second category is concerned with 
how each person thinks reform should generally happen based on which actor(s), tool(s), and 
place(s) of implementation—three subcategories—each interviewee considers the most effective 
or important in educational reform. 
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The categories emerged after analyzing every interview with a clean slate.  With little 
prior background in education, I was not aware of people’s ideologies, factions, parties or other 
affiliations.  In order to create my categories, I listened to the audio of each interview again 
marking down every comment about the topics of this thesis according to whether the 
interviewee said it negatively, positively, or neutrally.3  I attempted to be as objective as 
possible, responding to the interviewee’s tone and evaluations rather than if I thought the 
comment was about a negative or positive aspect of a topic.  I created a chart on which every 
interviewee’s name was listed in a column down the left and every topic was listed across the 
top: Detroit schools, EFM, charter schools, suggestions, and “ideologies.”  In the ideologies 
column I included extra comments that had to do with education or reform overall and helped me 
see the foundation beneath what each person was saying.  However, as seen in the following 
section, I will split interviewees into ‘stances’ instead of “ideologies.”   
If someone made the same point more than once, each recurrence would add an 
additional positive or negative sign next to the original comment to include the emphasis of 
repetition.  After everything was written out, I compared across each row to create a stance for 
each person.  Looking down a column presented the relevant and comparable data about each 
specific topic.   
I think that there is much to learn from categorizing the comments and grouping 
interviewees.  Splitting interviewees into different groups teaches us about each of them.  We 
can also see the similarities and differences they have with people in different groups as well as 
to people in their same categories.  We can also see how each interviewee’s vantage point and 
stances affect how he or she evaluates Detroit’s challenges and suggest improvements.  Lastly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-!For the relevant pieces of these notes, transferred into a electronic table, see Appendix B!
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there are things to be learned about how reformers in general think about reform.  Using the 
categories of my interviewee’s stances (actors, tools, and places), I created a process of reform 
that will help guide our evaluation of reform and our development of future reform. 
 
Interviewees’ Vantages on Detroit   
Table 2 presents my analysis of interviewees’ vantage points on education reform in 
Detroit schools.  I split the categories by how close the interviewees are to reform in Detroit.  
The closest to the action are the people who are positioned within Detroit schools.  I further split 
that category into administrators and teachers.  Next are those who are specifically involved in 
Detroit reform from the community level or from a university level.  Both are actively involved 
in Detroit but not working through the district school system.  I signify which interviewees are 
from the University of Michigan and although these people are knowledgeable about Detroit and 
reform, they are not currently or directly engaged in it, unless otherwise noted.  The farthest 
removed category, although not to be discounted, is that of an outside activist, neither involved 
directly in Detroit nor the university.   
 
Table 2: Interviewee’s positions in relation to Detroit school reform 
 Detroit 
Public 
Schools 
(Administra
tor) 
Detroit 
Public 
Schools 
(Teacher) 
Detroit 
Community 
Consortium 
  
University 
of 
Michigan 
Outside 
community 
  
Roy 
Roberts 
!      
Irene 
Nordé 
!      
Walter 
McLean 
! 
(Past) 
! 
(Past) 
    
! +)!
Vienna 
Williams 
 !     
Jerry 
Rankin 
  ! !   
Laura Roop    ! !  
Nkem 
Khumbah 
 
   ! 
(Past) 
!  
Elizabeth 
Moje 
    ! 
(Past: 
involved in 
reform with 
DPS) 
 
Jeffrey 
Mirel 
    !  
Rebecca 
Platte 
     ! 
 
Interviewees’ Implicit Stances on Reform 
Along with their position within the system of education reform in Detroit, I wanted to 
categorize my interviewees into ‘ideologies:’ generalizations about people’s beliefs about 
reform.  Many published educational works include generalizations like this.  For example, Larry 
Cuban, in As Good As It Gets (2010), describes two national parties of school reformers.  They 
lay at two ends of a continuum, he says, that do not align with the typical divisions of political 
liberalism or conservativism (Cuban, 2010).  First is the ‘Effective Schools and Districts’ crowd 
that has argued “for decades” that schools run by strong leaders and teachers who value 
efficiency, high standards, and accountability can achieve excellence and equity for all students, 
no matter what students’ family background (Cuban, 2010, p. 7-8).  Positive changes, for this 
faction, are those that put accountability for student success on teachers and administrators 
(Cuban, 2010). 
 On the other end of the teeter-totter is the ‘Improved Schools and Community’ party 
(Cuban, 2010, p. 9).  These reformists do not believe that school improvement alone can 
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substantially close achievement gaps in the long-term (Cuban, 2010).  Instead, reform must 
include both in-school and out-of-school efforts to weaken the strong link between a student’s 
socioeconomic background and his/her academic achievement (Cuban, 2010).  Improvement, for 
this crowd, involves connecting families and communities with early education programs, health 
services, parent education, and programs for students after school and during the summer (9).   
 This way of sorting people was helpful for me in interpreting a few of the people I 
interviewed.  For example, Jerry Rankin fit neatly into Cuban’s Effective Schools and Districts 
faction.  Rankin believes that students have “all kinda social issues that's plaguing their 
consciousness” but that they are just “a challenge in being able to keep them intrigued.”  He tells 
his students that their “brain works just as well [as every other student’s]” and his goal through 
his teachings are to empower them with learning.  He knows that they can learn, no matter what 
outside problems they must overcome. 
Unfortunately, not all of my interviewees split into Cuban’s factions and even for those 
that did, I still felt that his teeter-totter with the two parties on opposite ends was not a complete 
picture of reform.  Cuban’s two groups only consider where reform should happen: one would 
say the schools and districts while the other would include schools but also communities and 
families, however, they do not address much more than that.  This does not tell us who reformers 
think should be deciding upon and implementing reform or what the tools to implementing that 
reform are.   
Cuban’s teeter-totter is a neat way of looking at educational ideologies that span more 
than just liberal or conservative, but the process or reform is not two-dimensional and neither are 
people’s stances.  Thus, I created the categories that I saw shaping up across my interviews.  
They cannot be called ideologies because they are not as general and universal as Cuban’s may 
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be.  Instead, I will call them stances: people’s underlying positions on educational reform.  Table 
3, below, is made up of three categories.  First is “actors:” who should be creating and 
implementing reforms.  This includes all of the stakeholders that we heard about repeatedly in 
Detroit’s history: The community (including families), teachers and other school faculty 
(including their unions), the local school system and the leaders at this level (in this case 
Detroit), and the state (recently becoming more and more involved).  Ravitch reminds us to 
include federal actors, and I expanded this to “all” to encompass the stance that reform is most 
effective when every actor at every level is involved. 
The second category encompasses what tools people consider necessary in order to make 
change.  These tools are critical to navigating the naturally slow, difficult, and hazardous reform 
process.  My interviewees had different stances on what the most important tool when making 
reform is.  There are three types that emerged: data, collaboration, and context.  The first, data, 
refers to the best practice from Detroit’s history as well from both Ravitch and Cuban’s books: 
reform can only (and should only) be enacted if we research it, evaluate it, and gain data about it.  
The people who stress the importance of this tool want to constantly assess past and current 
efforts and use that data to improve education.  This tool will help make sure that our reforms are 
levelheaded and effective.  Rebecca Platte, for example, saw research and evaluation as an “issue 
core to [her] work and [her] interests.”  When I asked her for possible solutions for Detroit 
schools she said that one is “making sure that when we recommend options for failing schools 
that we actually know that they’re better than the alternative or better than the status quo.” 
The second tool, collaboration, also contains a best practice from Mirel’s history as well 
as his in-person interview.  In his words, “My book was a lot about the formation and collapse of 
the political coalitions in the Detroit schools… If you could get [the labor union, the board of 
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commerce, and the Michigan Manufacturers Association] to agree then the money would 
continue to flow.”  Along with collaboration comes communication, a necessity for working 
together.  The most important piece of this is the need for and power of working together to 
make change.  As Nkem Khumbah puts concisely, “the best way of solving problems is to form 
alliances and synergy and communication, genuine communication.” 
Third, “Context” refers to the consideration of the complex background surrounding 
every reform and policy.  Some reformers believe that it is a necessity to examine the context of 
reform when making or evaluating change.  For example, I included the history of Detroit 
schools in this thesis because I believe that it greatly affects the current situation in Detroit and 
that we can learn from it.  These historical and national contexts are tools we can use to better 
evaluate and improve current educational initiatives.  Elizabeth Moje believes that considering 
context helps us better judge each actor or organization involved with reform because it helps us 
understand them and refrain from making generalizations about them. 
As an example of this, the current and past teachers I interviewed—especially Moje, 
Rankin, and Vienna Williams—always consider the contexts in which their students live and 
how they affect their students.  Williams spoke about a push, some time ago, for “whole 
language” learning which meant that “kids will learn to read because they just read books” and 
how that was unrealistic for many urban students: “there's so many people in their houses and so 
much noise goin’ on and cursin’ and drinkin’ and smokin’ and this and that… how do I expect 
them to sit there and concentrate on reading a book?”  And when it comes down to it, she said, 
“they don’t have any books.”  Those who believe in the power of context know that every 
person, every reform, and every district cannot be examined alone: you need to understand the 
environment surrounding them.   
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The third category in Table 3 is what Cuban tackles with his factions: the site of 
implementation.  Once we have our reformers and they are using tools to effectively create 
change, where are they focusing their efforts?  This is not a literal location but general categories 
of recipients of reform.  Cuban gives us the options of making schools and districts more 
effective and/or improving communities and families.  I used these categories but split up 
schools and districts as well as added one more.   
This additional place of implementation encompasses all of the above, adding in change 
at the state and national levels.  Roop named it a “systems approach:” the category for those 
people who believe that reform must change the entire system in order to substantially solve 
problems.  For instance, Laura Roop repeatedly said that if reform efforts were not “scalable,” 
they were “superficial.”  Her most memorable phrase was that of a reform (for example, bringing 
in an EFM) only being “a band-aid at the place of the greatest hemorrhage.”  In regards to the 
charter school push, “it’s never gonna be able to serve enough kids to make a big enough 
difference.”  Her stance was one of the most pessimistic I encountered and at first, such a 
systems approach seems impossible, but her stance, like every one present here, has something to 
teach us if we consider it.  For example, what makes charters a “partial strategy” and the EFM a 
band-aid?  What bigger issues need to be solved here and how can we begin to tackle them? 
Every reformer can have a different combination of these pieces that constitutes their 
stance on reform, as seen with the ten people I interviewed.  Even with similar categories 
between “actors” verses “places,” one person can be placed in different categories across them.  
For example, Walter McLean thinks that every actor needs to be involved in creating change at a 
community level, while Nkem Khumbah thinks the opposite—that community members should 
create change to affect the whole education system.  For McLean, one of the most important 
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solutions for Detroit is to improve the “family community” where “adults [help] parents keep 
children in check.”  To help us get back to a time where there are expectations that every 
community member needs to help kids succeed in school, McLean thinks that our country on a 
grand scheme needs to prioritize education.  
Khumbah, on the other hand, says that the people should be the ones to take charge of 
educational change: “the schools board, the city council, the church community.”  He opposes 
any other non-community actors of reform who act as “hammers.”  He argues, that no one can 
“come and actually tell [Detroiters] that your solution is better for their children and their 
grandchildren” than their solutions are.  These democratic, grass-roots reforms should aim, 
Khumbah says, to change the “systemic problem.”  Like Roop, he thinks that change needs to be 
implemented across every level of education.  
Using the three separate category groupings can be tricky, especially since it is rare that 
any reformer fits neatly into categories without some overlap.  Not everyone in the same 
category is homogeneous either.  But from these categories, I built my theory of how reformation 
should work.  I believe that reform is a process of change built upon certain actors using certain 
tools in order to ensure the success of their reforms in a specific place of implementation.  There 
is not necessarily a ‘most effective’ combination of pieces, but each actor, tool, and place has its 
own strengths and we should consider each of them.  If we want to effectively create positive 
change in Detroit and around the country, we cannot forget any piece of this process.  As you 
create, implement, or evaluate any education reform, ask yourself what pieces of the 
process (actors, tools, places) you (and/or the creator of the reform) currently are deeming 
as most important.  Then look again, consider every piece in the process, and evaluate 
which ones you should be deeming as most important. 
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The last, but not least, piece in the process is considering what the specific reform to be 
implemented is.  For example, Williams’ discussed the specific initiative of ‘whole language 
learning.’  Creating the EFM position or a new charter school is an example of an implemented 
solution.  Cuban writes that those in his Effective Schools and Districts faction typically 
implement business reforms.  Even though people’s stances affect the reforms they are most 
likely to suggest, I will not be putting any of these specific reforms in Table 3.  I do not think 
they could even be succinctly categorized.  However, I do hope that by analyzing the reforms 
that my interviewees suggest and by comparing the stances as well as positions of the people that 
made them, we can learn more about the suggestions/solutions themselves.  This final piece will 
be found in the following conclusion sections. 
 
Table 3: Reform actors, tools, and places (3.a. below) 
Most influential reform actors Most important tools for creating 
change 
 
Commu
nity/ 
Families 
Teachers Local 
School 
System 
State All Data/ 
Evaluation
/ Research 
Communication
/ Collaboration 
Context 
   
Roy 
Roberts 
  !   ! ! ! 
Irene 
Nordé 
  !   ! ! ! 
Walter 
McLean 
    ! ! !  
Vienna 
Williams 
 !    !  ! 
Jerry 
Rankin 
 !      ! 
Laura 
Roop 
   ! !  !  
Nkem 
Khumbah 
!      ! ! 
Elizabeth 
Moje 
 !    !  ! 
! ++!
Jeffrey 
Mirel 
    !  ! ! 
Rebecca 
Platte 
 !  !  !   
Table 3.a. Reform places 
Most important place of implementation  
Communities/ 
families 
Schools 
 
Local school 
system 
Entire system 
  
Roy Roberts   !  
Irene Nordé  ! !  
Walter McLean  !  !  
Vienna Williams ! !   
Jerry Rankin  !   
Laura Roop    ! 
Nkem Khumbah     ! 
Elizabeth Moje ! !   
Jeffrey Mirel   !  
Rebecca Platte    ! 
 
Analysis of Current Detroit Education Reforms 
Emergency Financial Manager ! Walter McLean noted that it was important to ask about why it was “necessary” to bring 
in an EFM: “What was it [in Detroit] that brought it to that point?  What was going awry?  What 
systems were broken within the system? …What things… should have been sustained that were 
not, that were best practices?”   
The purpose of the EFM, Nkem Khumbah would answer, “is to improve the financial 
situation in the system.”  Almost every interviewee also defined the situation that necessitated an 
EFM, as a state of financial failure.  This point should not surprise us.  We already saw that this 
was the case, that the position was created after superintendent of public instruction Mike 
Flanagan found Detroit to be in a “state of financial emergency.”  But when we think back to 
those financial problems, they were largely caused by a much wider context (in time and place) 
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than bringing in one man could fix.  The following responses thus show us the pieces of the 
financial problem that can be fixed by changing the leadership structure of the schools. 
Irene Nordé said that the financial problems arose because “for too long, too many people 
were writing checks and not enough people [were] balancing the budget.”  The school district did 
not realize that as “the city size starts declining” the budget was going to be declining as well 
because “it's built on the student population that was declining” (Nordé).  Now, she said, the 
district needs to own up to that and let the EFM create an “appropriate budget” for the schools.  
“As a business we needed to forecast or see down our future that we were gonna have to start 
getting smaller and we have started closing schools, but we haven't done it to the extent that we 
needed to do it” (Nordé).  In Roop’s words: “you actually have to right-size the district, you can't 
have like a million buildings open and no funding for any of them.”  Rebecca Platte stated that 
“if you believe that there should be a Detroit Public Schools to begin with then you need to be 
thinking about long-term viability” and that is the goal of consolidating finances.  These 
comments legitimize the actions of past and future leaders who closed schools in Detroit. 
Jerry Rankin defined the state of financial failure as one caused by “the lack of 
responsibility and the lack of proper business procedures and accounting procedures [that] did 
not clearly identify the sources who were helping themselves”: a financial exploitation of the 
system.  Platte also mentioned the financial corruption, whether illegal or unethical, as one of the 
biggest challenges for Detroit.  The goal of having an EFM, Rankin said, was “to stop the 
flagrant waste and poor financial management of the resources.” !As Nordé put it, the EFM is 
suppose to create financial “checks and balance:” verifying and validating every expenditure.  
“You need someone who's balancing the check book!” (Nordé).  These conditions were the 
reasons behind the new EFM role, and whoever acts as EFM should understand that the 
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EFM needs to maintain an appropriately sized budget to allow the schools to stay afloat, as 
well as reduce the financial corruption within the school district. 
The next piece of McLean’s earlier questioning is asking, “why couldn’t just we find a 
great superintendent… who could come in with appropriate staff… and reframe this?”  Rankin’s 
answer is that an EFM brings a “business mind… to the situation.”  They will know how to 
identify and stop people who are financially abusing the system and will be able to shrink the 
district to ensure its financial stability.  Vienna Williams agreed that one good thing about the 
EFM was their “common sense” about financial things compared to superintendents who made 
the “dumbest decisions.”  This business and finance experience and perspective is necessary 
for the jobs that the EFM is required to do. 
The EFM position is also different from that of superintendent because the voters or the 
school board cannot remove whomever the state appoints.  This autocracy of the role has the 
potential to reduce the high level of superintendent turnover that plagues Detroit (and the nation).  
Roy Roberts presented the fact that “the average life of superintendent of schools is 3.5 years.”  
With each turnover, McLean said, you lose the “sense of positive continuity” and must redo the 
culture.  Williams pointed out the waste of having to pay the fired superintendent as well as the 
new one that is hired.  She categorized this as part of the financial waste before Detroit had an 
EFM.  In contrast to this constant turnover, McLean considers the 1970s in Detroit to be a period 
of success because there was “continuity of thought and practice and vision and purpose” 
because the superintendent at the time was in charge for over 13 years.   
The reason for the turnover around the nation, argued Roberts, is because of the structure 
of leadership.  “In this nation,” he said, “every reformer that got fired, none was fired for 
education, they were fired for political reasons… you were on the board and you hired me, cause 
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you liked me, all of a sudden you’re off the board and you got new members on that you don’t 
like and he’s out of there.”  Williams continues, “it seems like every time [Detroit] got somebody 
who was trying to really do something, they got rid of him.”  Some people argue that ex-
superintendent Connie Calloway is an example of this; that the school board fired her because it 
did not like that she wanted to make drastic change (Lessenberry, 2009).  Mirel believes the 
autocracy of the role is good because it allows the EFM to make quick and decisive change.  An 
EMF is better for “catching of the people who were misusing funds,” agreed Williams.  The 
autocratic nature of the EMF position could protect the district from constant turnover 
and allow change to be made more efficiently.   
Herein lies the paradox of the position of EFM.  As referenced above, one of the reasons 
the system wants an EFM is to create a system of “checks and balances” for the financial goings-
on, many times unethically, in the city.  What makes an EFM the best person for this duty, 
besides his or her assumed business acumen, is that the EFM role is autocratic and thus removed 
from the typical system of check and balances.  On the other hand, one of the biggest problems 
that some people have with the EFM is that “there is no checks and balances for [him or her]… 
they get to do whatever they wanna do” (Williams).   
We should examine some of these theoretical negatives that possibly come along with 
this EFM role.  After we consider these negatives we can conclude more accurately about 
whether the paradox of the EFM acting as a check but not being checked is more of a pro or a 
con of the position. 
At a systemic level, Khumbah saw bringing in an EFM without checks and balances as 
undermining democracy and thus very “dangerous.”  He gave the example, “It's like going to DC 
someday and saying that we'll stop the Presidency, we will stop Congress, and we will get a 
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corporate guy to come around and turn this country around because we're in a deep budget 
[crisis]…”  Even though he understands how much of a “crisis” Detroit it in, and knows that the 
“democratic system… has its flaws of efficiency,” in his eyes, bringing in an EFM is inherently 
worse.  “It doesn’t work that way,” he said, “because the bottom of society it's a democratic 
system.”   
One of the takeaways drawn from Diane Ravitch’s book (2010) was that changes from 
the bottom up make it easier to gain credibility, support, and objective review, all of which are 
necessary pieces to creating support for reforms.  Bringing in top-down control with an EFM, on 
the other hand, is like a hammer on the system and reduces buy-in from the community and 
educators, Khumbah said.  “Change from within, people are part of it, its part of their lives, they 
accept it, they buy-in, they own it.  And when it doesn't go right they blame themselves for it.  
When it comes from outside, they leave it up to you… But their lives are the ones involved.”  
Buy-in can be lost at all levels—individual community members and families, teachers, and 
administrators—and when it is, serious harm has been done. 
When the EFM, his team, and those who appoint him are outsiders, the take over seems 
even more unwelcome and further reduces buy-in.  Khumbah said that in Detroit “the proposals 
for solutions are not coming from the people themselves who are involved.  They come from 
outside agents.”  These outsiders “have no clue what the problem [is],” at least not more than on 
a theoretical level.  Khumbah knows that these people from outside Detroit “cannot be knowing 
better [the people of Detroit’s] future then they do.  You cannot come and actually tell them that 
your solution is better for their children and their grandchildren than they do.”  Nordé 
commented on her own experiences working in Detroit and concludes that because she knows 
about “the climate… the culture… [and] the problems” she can “get started with the work at a 
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much faster rate” and “start targeting what [she] need[s] to do.”  The more an EFM truly 
knows about Detroit before coming in, the faster and more effective they are at their work 
and representing the Detroit community and gaining their support. 
Khumbah also argued that an EFM “ends up leaving the school district worse than they 
came in because all decision are not based… on education philosophy or theory or organizational 
management on how to bring out the best education, it’s based on friendship and cutting costs.”  
Elizabeth Moje warned us that “if it's all about a bottom line without taking into account 
pedagogical principles or… what's best for kids basically, then it's a recipe for disaster.”  Here 
we can remember what we have seen as a best practice through the nation and Detroit’s history: 
that positive and effective reforms are those that focus on students and what goes on in the 
classroom.  Platte restated this when she said she does not think that improving the financial 
system is “the issue that's gonna make a difference for kids and their outcomes.” 
Williams agrees that “making cuts in a business is different from making cuts in a 
school.”  She knows that “you can't make a good decision about something unless you've been 
there.”  Moje thinks that “in an ideal situation, a financial manager who is surrounded by people 
with expertise in education, who is attuned to the needs of teachers and students and their 
parents… can work very very well.”  The person needs to “recognize the needs and fit the needs 
of an education system” (Moje). 
At this point, we need to acknowledge how the EFM role changed when Rick Snyder 
became governor and that now Roberts has control over the finances and academics of Detroit 
schools.  This is a move that gives Roberts’ even more single-manned control, but Moje might 
see this as an improvement.  She said that, “at the University of Michigan, the budget model 
works so that the Provost is both the academic-chief academic officer and chief budget officer, 
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it's not a separate position. And that was very intentional because it meant that the chief budget 
officer would always have an academic mission at her or his core.”  After this new change, it is 
even more important that the EFM (or leader of the system) needs to have experience in the 
classroom and with education or at least refer heavily to those on the academic side of 
things.  Even if an EFM succeeds with the district’s finances this does not mean that they should 
get to try their hand at the academic part of things too (as was suggested near the end of Robert 
Bobb’s time as EMF).  
Although there are takeaways from discussing the EFM position theoretically, an analysis 
of the role will only be complete after specifically examining whoever holds the position.  
Whether the paradox above in which the EFM acts as a check on the system but has no checks 
upon him or herself turns out for the better or worse, depends largely on the person.  The 
importance of individual actors cannot be undermined here.  Cuban wrote that many times 
success is the result of “Superman” or “Wonder Women” leaders: extraordinary individuals who 
revive districts with their remarkable political smarts, force of will, energy, and time (2010, p. 
142).  Mirel, in his interview and in his piece published in 2004, stated the caveat that the 
possibility of change, which is potent in such an autocratic position, depends on the strong “do 
good” vision of whoever fills the position.  Reading the history and seeing the national examples 
of different leaders gives us a sense of this, but the following first-hand interviews show the deep 
importance of personal characteristics. 
When addressing the issue of EMF, four interviewees spoke generally about the role 
alone, while six interviewees spoke specifically about the person filling the role, Roy Roberts.  
The six that referred to Roberts directly were the six that work in Detroit (and thus are the six 
farthest to the left on Table 1): Roberts himself, Nordé, McLean, Williams, Rankin, and Roop.  
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The fact that the people within the system commented specifically on the person holding the 
EFM role, both Robert Bobb and Roy Roberts, shows how much the individual leader and their 
characteristics matter.  When outsiders look in at a system, they sometimes downplay the man or 
woman within the role, when they should not.  Do not forget that changing the person holding 
the same exact role can vastly change the reality of that position. 
Analyzing these specific comments about Roberts, the following section will examine 
how the current EFM, Roy Roberts, is fulfilling the expectations set for him as well as avoiding 
the negatives that could come along with his position.  I was also privileged enough to get to 
speak to Roberts himself about the role he has occupied for almost a year now.  His own 
responses will supplement others’ comments.   
To begin, Roberts understands the financial reasons he is needed in Detroit.  He 
mentioned that he was brought in because “people will steal from the district because they don’t 
care about the kids” and that he has “had to stop all that.”  He recognized the district deficit that 
he reduced from $347M when he was appointed “to $89 million in 6 months.”  Williams has 
more trust in Roberts’ ability to do this as compared to “the one we had before” who “made a 
bigger deficit.”  
Roberts also recognizes the importance of his “business acumen” in securing the 
necessary finances.  Roop, even with a more negative outlook on the situation that most, praised 
that Roberts is “from the corporate world, comes into it with the ability to analyze that kind of 
data…, [and] assessed the financial thing and cut the deals he needed to do to get some of the 
debt off the front of the table and that kind of thing.”  Roberts aptly concluded, “So the financial 
piece: major major issue.”  He seems to understand why he is there; the problems that 
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necessitated his job and the goals that people through the system see as belonging to the EFM.  
He seems to be reaching the goals set for him. 
Above, I concluded that the EFM himself should understand Detroit in order to more 
efficiently do his job as well as make it clear that he is doing it in the best interest of the people 
of Detroit.  Nordé and Roop commented on Robert’s appropriate background for the job.  Roop 
reflected positively on Roberts’ knowledge of education in the state of Michigan as well as in 
Detroit.  “He knows Detroit,” she said, “knows Detroit people and politics and can walk in that 
very complex space” as compared to Past EMF Bobb who “didn't know how to work in this 
context… the combination of Detroit and Michigan.” 
In terms of Roberts being an educator: he is not.  However, he does grasp the importance 
of academics.  Although he says that the finances of the district are a major issue, he told me that 
it is “getting the academics in place that will move the young people forward.”  When I met him 
it was clear that he truly cares about the students.  He told me, “I’ve been clear with all 
audiences, if it’s not about kids, don’t waste my time.”  He also knows that he cannot make 
decisions, financially or academically, by himself.  In our interview, he said, “I have to use my 
business acumen, coupled with the acumen of all the academic people around me to put a team 
together, to impact the lives of these young people.” 
The last step of evaluation is to examine how Roberts is doing within such an autocratic 
role: Is he fulfilling the positive aspects and avoiding the negative possibilities?  First off, 
Roberts recognizes that “we need some stability in this school district.”  He understands that the 
goal is for him to remain in the position because “every time you bring in a new superintendent, 
they have to demonstrate their worth: they change the system. And when you do that, principals 
can’t adjust, teachers can’t adjust, and kids get hurt.”  His being in office was a big thing, he told 
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me, because it allowed his job to be about the kids while in most cities “the system doesn’t 
work” because it does not allows leaders to focus on children.   Robert saw his position of EFM 
as a solution to that problem.  “They can’t fire me,” he said.  “I was selected, not elected. I report 
to the governor and the governor only.” 
This does beg the question of whether he will abuse the autocracy of the position, but 
Roberts seems to be doing a good job of avoiding presenting himself as a dictator.  The most 
important key to this has been gaining buy-in from all levels of the system that pre-existed him.  
Roberts’ success at cultivating buy-in needs to be paralleled by the failure of his predecessor.  
Khumbah told me, without using names, that when Bobb came in there was no buy-in so he “had 
to fire almost everybody in there.”  Khumbah explained that “when you come in and there's not 
buy-in you cannot work in that context.  Then you get rid of them… or you yourself are out. And 
since you have the power, you get rid of them and bring your own folks” which is exactly what 
Bobb did.   
Getting rid of all the dissidents may allow a leader to do what he or she wants but it 
weakens the buy-in of the community.  Bobb’s major mistake that lost him Detroit’s trust was 
bringing outside people in to fix Detroit, outside people who “have no clue how Detroit looks 
like” (Khumbah).  Nordé herself worked under Bobb and experienced the cuts that Khumbah 
referenced.  At the administrative level he took over everything, bringing in his own friends… 
even going so far as to cut the math department (Nordé).  She was removed even though she had 
more experience in Detroit than Bobb’s friends did. 
When Roberts came in, restored the “best candidates” for jobs, and knew how to support 
employees without micromanaging, Nordé was thrilled.  From the remarks made specifically 
about Roberts, the importance of his business experience in working with the employees of the 
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district and creating buy-in amongst them is clear.  Nordé shared how Roberts’ CEO experience 
means that he knows “the added value of his employees within the company” and how to 
“support and even move out the way so that others can do their part.”  Roberts spoke about the 
difficultly of the job and that things got “a bit more comfortable” once he “started to learn the 
talent of the people and knew who I could call on to get something done.”  “Very few people are 
from the outside,” Roberts reported, “All they wanted was a chance.”  This just shows that he 
knows the importance of the people already around him and the skills they have.  Having the 
skills to effectively work with existing local employees is a key factor in creating successful 
buy-in. 
Reducing the buy-in of the school faculty, Bobb “brought in so many people that he 
knew.  He… awarded contracts to his relatives' people… his friends’ son…” reported Williams.  
She saw the affects of these biased decisions and clearly disliked Bobb for them.  This dislike of 
outside contractors has existed at least since 2003, during Kenneth Burnley’s time as CEO of the 
schools.  She said that she does not “really see that or hear things going on like that with this 
current emergency manager… he seems like he’s making sound decisions.”  It seems clear after 
looking at the contrast between how Bobb and Roberts handled outside consultants that a part of 
being welcomed in as a leader, is not bringing in outsiders to do the inside jobs.   
Williams was not the only one who said something along the lines of “I don't have too 
big of a gripe with… the Emergency Financial Manager we have now” (especially in comparison 
to Bobb).  General community members, represented by both Rankin and McLean, “believe in 
what [Roberts] believes in and the approach [Roberts] wants to take” (McLean) as well as his 
sincerity and integrity (Rankin).  Roberts himself knows the importance of this positive 
relationship with the community.  When I asked about changes he is enacting that are going to 
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help the system, he spoke about his ties with the community, saying, “this community respects 
me. This community knows I will not steal, I will not cheat, and I care about kids.” 
Roberts calmed my mind most when we he then said, “I have the authority not to deal 
with the union or not to deal with the school board… I have all that authority under Public Act 4, 
[but] I don’t have to utilize it.  Because if you use that power indiscriminately, you’ll never be 
respected.  You’ve got to function in a way that you can be respected for what you do, and do 
classier work… I can cancel any contract, but I won’t do that!”  When he came onto the job, 
Roberts knew, “if they have a voice and wanna talk, I want to hear it. Because I’m gonna do 
what I have to do to educate kids.” 
It seems that in terms of filling a role that could become negatively dictator-like or 
positively effective and efficient to varying degrees, Roberts has been doing a good job.  The 
EFM has a lot of power, and how he or she uses it is critical.  As Williams said in reflection of 
such a position: “you appoint someone to oversee our district, they make a dumb decision, and 
then you tell us we have to pay for it,” so those decisions need to be quality as well as involve 
the community.  Roberts has managed to not push the community or the current Detroit 
educational leaders away.  Let us just hope that he can continue these positive efforts and remain 
a long-term efficient but democratic leader (as much as he can be), reducing the turnover that 
disrupts the system.   
I hope that the takeaways discussed above will always help define what things all EFMs 
should do.  State governors can use them to help guide their appointments and EFMs can use 
them as a way to check their own actions.  However, even though people within the system 
should use those same takeaways to measure how each specific EFM is doing, because the EFM 
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role is so autocratic it is harder to remove someone from that spot if he or she is not doing a good 
job. 
  Overall, I endorse both the role of Emergency Financial Manager and Roy Roberts.  I 
believe what McLean does: that a quality EFM with “appropriate human resources. Of people 
who know this work” can “reshape and put the systems back in place for an effective district.”  
But I want to go through the process of reform laid out in the previous interview section based on 
the categories of actors, tools, and implementation to explain the few ways in which I think the 
position can be improved. 
Considering those categories, the reform of bringing an EFM into Detroit is a change of 
who is enacting reform.  The EFM position gives power largely to a combination of “local school 
system” and “state” actors.  Some interviewees believe that different actors would be more 
efficient.  Khumbah, for example, thinks very poorly of bringing in an EFM because he sees 
“community/families” as the most important actors of reform.  The EFM gives the state more 
control instead of letting the community democratically be the actors of change.  Khumbah’s 
concerns of protecting democracy are persuasive but I do not think that just renewing the board 
of education in Detroit and giving it the power over a superintendent is the best way to currently 
use a democratic process to help the schools.  I do not endorse removing Roberts and giving the 
power back to voters because I think that Roberts has the qualities, as discussed above, to work 
through financial problems in a way that board members do not.  I also think that an EFM can 
offer more stability than a board.  The creation of the EFM position is also partially due to the 
failure of decentralization in Detroit’s past, resulting not because of the state’s involvement but 
because of some of the community’s own failures.   
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I also want to argue that the type of cooperation that Khumbah wants, that is found 
throughout Detroit’s history, is no longer a likely occurrence at all.  This cooperation was a 
coming together of different interest groups to form coalitions, strong in numbers, that make 
change through the polls.  These groups may have different ideologies or see the education 
system in a different light but they all have the same goal at that time.  The EFM position curbs 
any possibility of future coalitions growing and making change because they no longer have 
defined paths of power.  However, the EFM is not the only inhibitor.  Mirel, in his interview, 
stressed that when “the coalition [of labor and business] fell apart [it] could not be reformed.”  
He did not think “you could right now put together a working coalition of interest groups.” 
I think that there is a new type of cooperation that is possible and more powerful growing 
in Detroit.  It is a cooperation of not just community level actors, but all levels of actors.  I think 
that now, in this time in which the state is paying attention to Detroit’s schools, it would be 
beneficial to strengthen lines of communication from the community up to the EFM in order to 
create this new kind of communication, cooperation, and sense of ownership of the changes 
being made.  Back in 1999, when Mayor Dennis Archer and Governor John Engler created 
mayoral control, there was one columnist in Detroit who seemed to be paying attention to the 
pros and cons of centralization (Stroud 1999, Franklin 2003).  He argued that reformers had to 
find a balance between centralization and decentralization that would create change through 
“accountability imposed from above as well as from the empowerment of parents and students at 
the most intimate level” (Stroud 1999, Franklin 2003).   
To build this, we must begin with one of Khumbah’s suggestions regarding democratic 
control that I think can improve the system.  First of all, he reminded me that outside actors 
cannot forget that the people in Detroit “are very heavily invested in their welfare… They feel 
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the pinch of things going wrong more than anybody else.”  Thus, when any level of actors comes 
in to help fix problems in Detroit they must acknowledge the important Detroit actors: “their 
mayor, their school board president, the church community…” (Khumbah).  To acknowledge 
these people is to tackle the problem “humanly” and Khumbah thinks this is the only way we 
should be going about reform.   
I think that increased transparency would make sure that all levels of actors are 
acknowledged and feel involved and responsible to the changes their EFM is making.  Williams 
suggested this, hoping to have a “candid way of seeing what's spent on what… see[ing] the 
decisions that are being made in my district [emphasis added].”   Whether people have a way to 
make suggestions or not, transparency is the first concern: letting the people who live and work 
in their school district see what things the administration is doing.  From this they can make their 
judgments. 
The next necessary piece in Detroit is the communication.  One of Khumbah’s resonating 
points is that “in a democracy, what makes it strong, and the best way of solving problems is to 
form alliances and synergy and communication, genuine communication.”  This communication 
needs to be both ways; sharing knowledge up and down the channels; vertically and horizontally.  
In this way, William Coleman was praised for his communication with parents, students, and 
faith-based groups during his time as CEO.  Robert Bobb also smoothed out the process of 
change and was further interconnected with the city as he developed his collaboration with 
Mayor Dave Bing.  Nordé knows that “the number one issue in any large district is 
communication.”  
The next step, is gathering the input from the important community, school, and district 
level actors.  Teachers are especially important and powerful educational actors and the EFM 
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should consider their input.  Williams said that she would “like to see… a willingness to get 
feedback from people who are… in the trenches, before decisions are made. So before you 
decide 'ok we're going to come out with this other test', then could you pilot it a few places? 
Could you just… do a survey and see what the teachers are thinkin’ about it?”  This practice not 
only helps ensure that the reforms work in the classroom but that teachers buy into them.  She 
said that if teachers did get the chance to offer input, “once we actually put the program 
throughout the district, we probably wouldn't have so many teachers saying 'you know what, I'm 
not using that.'”   
These paths of communication and input, in a system with top-down leadership, will need 
to be further explored and defined.  What will these lines of communication look like?  Nordé 
went through the process of establishing this communication when her math department was 
restored.  She set up a monthly meeting for one main representative from every building so she 
“can give them some direction and information about what's changing in mathematics 
education.”  She also created a newsletter than she sends to every math teacher in the district.  
The final piece was creating an online facebook-like professional community.  There are things 
like this that I think could be developed to show teachers and community members what is going 
on in the district as well as give them an opportunity to offer input. 
After transparency and communication, the third piece of this is an actual semblance of a 
checks and balances system around the EFM that protects Detroit from a dictator but does not 
threaten the positive stability of the EFM position.  In terms of what this will look like, I imagine 
a system that grows out of the cooperation of everyone within Detroit schools: teachers, 
principals, administrators…  These stakeholders offer their feedback of the EFM, which is then 
given to the EFM as well as the governor who has the power to remove that person.  If the EFM 
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is removed at any point, the superintendent under them should be protected by contract and 
allowed to work with the new EFM for at least a year.  This would help ensure that nothing is 
forgotten or changed too abruptly, attempting to offer some sense of the stability that in needed 
in Detroit. 
 This new kind of cooperation that I think is more possible as well as more powerful in 
present times requires a balance of centralization and decentralization to work.  “Accountability 
imposed from above as well as from the empowerment of parents and students at the most 
intimate level,” as was quoted before.  This requires an EFM who fills the role in accordance to 
the best practices here, as well as community-wide support of the EFM.  It also requires the 
empowerment of every other level of actors and communication between these levels, including 
a system of feedback on the EFM. 
Charter Schools 
There are many common themes across the discussion of charter schools that span all 
vantages and stances of my interviewees.  That largest common concern about charter schools is 
that of “quality control.”  In their own words, every single interviewee mentioned as a negative 
of charter schools, that there is no quality control among them.  Even for the people who are not 
categorized as having a stance of seeing research as an extremely important tool in reform, they 
still realized that the lack of data on charters schools is a negative.  This further shows the level 
of worry about the lack of quality control of charters.  This negative response mirrors the same 
conclusions that established reformers like Ravitch are reaching. 
It seems that many of my interviewees are responding to the hype across the nation that 
enveloped Detroit near the end of Bobb’s time as EFM that choice is better and therefore all 
charters are better.  Because the publics were failing, Bobb announced that he would replace 
them with charters, which seems like his endorsement of the higher quality of charter schools 
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across the board.  Moje, McLean, and Williams all commented that charters were not all better.  
Williams explicitly said, “The downside of the charter school is [that it is] being pushed as if it is 
a better option, when all the research supports that charter schools do not outperform public 
schools.”  Moje, wanting to avoid generalizations, said, “I'm disturbed by the implications that 
somehow they're better…what bothers me is when people say 'we need more charters'.”  There is 
not something inherently better about the fact that a school is a charter.  The governance of the 
school does not equal its success, which Platte also mentioned.   
Rankin and Nordé believe that overall, charters actually do “not deliver as well as the 
public school system in Detroit” (Rankin).!!McLean also weighed in that “there's not sufficient 
enough data so say that the work of the charter school concept is better than the public school 
concept.”  Platte, Nordé, and Roop all commented that charters “vary hugely in terms of quality” 
(Roop).  The main conclusion, after all this, is three-fold: charter schools on average are not 
better than publics, the governance of charter schools does not inherently make them 
better schools, and there is no quality control among charters and there needs to be.   
Luckily, it is clear that with the new change in leadership, Roberts has not bought into the 
generalization that charters are overall better than publics.  He said, “the jury’s still out on if 
[charters are] better than public education or anything else. Some are better and some are worse.”  
He knows that this lack of research and standards on charters schools could harm kids, kids for 
whom he is responsible.  He told me that he is “going to be responsible for every young person 
in the city of Detroit getting a quality education,” both public and charter.  To ensure this he 
knows that “there’s some things that we have to agree on. What are the standards we’d like to 
have for someone coming in to be a charter? And under what condition do we take them out?”  
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He knows that research, data, and standards are necessary when it comes to charter schools, 
even if the country has already endorsed them.   
 In order to make sure there is more quality control of the charters in Detroit, Roberts also 
wants to move slowly.  He shares the opinions of Platte, Roop, and Khumbah when he said, 
“when state legislatures… are taking the cap off the charters, that’s like the wild, wild west!”  
Roop, Platte, and Khumbah described this “wild wild west” as a state of fluctuation in which 
kids get lost; a place in which profits are made.  Platte argued that by opening the charter school 
cap in Detroit with “no kind of quality control… charter operators that do this work on the cheap, 
and that are maybe just as, if not more interested in making money than student achievement will 
grow and thrive and reproduce, and those charter operators that require that kind of infrastructure 
thing and that time and planning and those years to build their school won't… come to Michigan 
and even if they do, they're not gonna populate as much as these kind of poor performing 
charters.”  Roop thought that the fact that different people were extracting capital from Detroit 
schools in the “flux” of the situation was one of the biggest challenges in Detroit.  The for-profit 
aspect of many of the new charter schools was extremely worrisome not only to Platte and Roop 
but to Williams, Khumbah, and Rankin as well.   
Bobb’s plan was an invitation for these charters to come in.  Luckily when Roberts took 
office, he decided to scale down Bobb’s existing push for charters.  Although the press and 
Bobb’s Renaissance plan reported that Bobb was to create up to 45 charters, Roberts said that the 
plan was more like 15 when he entered the scene.  When I asked Roberts about this in our 
interview together, he said that he decided to slow things down “because I’m not convinced that 
we have good charter operators.  I’m not convinced that we know what is good.  So, I said let’s 
do 5.  We did 5.  We think they’re pretty good schools.”  Hopefully, slowing the process of 
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charter growth will allow high quality charters to take root in Detroit.  Ravitch (2010) wrote 
that getting an effective charter school running may take up to five years.  Some of them need a 
year to plan and the time to build up their grade-levels year after year in order to create the 
culture they want (Platte).   
 The current administration under Roberts does seem to be doing a good job of attempting 
systemic quality control: knowing not to generalize charters or publics, slowing down the growth 
of charters, and setting standards of quality.  But there are other smaller pieces across the board 
that need to be addressed in order to improve the quality of many of the charters in Detroit.  
Nordé, Williams, and Rankin said that the quality is suffering because the charter schools do not 
have enough supports.  Nordé mentioned the charters’ outdated material; Rankin worried about 
their lack of emphasis on the quality of teachers, especially new ones.  Williams said that 
because the charter schools pay teachers what the charters want, which is too little in her eyes, 
they get only new teachers.  These new teachers have neither veteran teachers to learn from nor 
professional development opportunities (Williams).  Charters have high turnover rates (Rankin).  
They have no union, structured support system, or curriculum (Williams).  Both Nordé and Mirel 
counted the charters’ lack of a common core as a huge lack of support as well.  Mirel elaborated 
to say that in Detroit, like in other urban districts, “children from impoverished families tend to 
move a lot” and if there is no common core, moving affects them even more negatively.  
Williams’ commented that under all of these conditions student success can only be low: “you 
get what you pay for.” 
In the end, although most of my interviewees reacted negatively to the fact that there was 
no quality control for charters, whether at the level of curriculum, teachers, funding, or overall 
success, every interviewee but one had some positives to say as well.  These positives can be 
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split into two categories: in-practice and theoretical.  Many of the individuals I interviewed 
acknowledged that, in practice, there are some good charters.  Roop, who criticized many pieces 
of the general charter school push, approves of nonprofit charters that can offer up proof of their 
quality.  Doug Ross’s University Prep charter schools, for example, are her example of being 
“quality and nonprofit.”  Nordé commented that some charters are good places with “honorable” 
people and “they can offer a smaller, more intimate setting.”  Williams acquiesced that charters 
get better parent participation.  But these details, we will realize, have to do with a larger 
theoretical discussion of charters that addresses the larger movement itself and its values: choice, 
business, and new modes of education. 
The consensus is that change and choice are not inherently bad.  Khumbah, bringing an 
objective view to the table, said that charters are just “different from what we know,” not bad, 
just different.  He said that although the charter movement “comes at an intersection of profit and 
public good,” charters can offer a public good.  Moje thinks that a positive of the charter 
movement is the “stimulus that charters have given all of us to change the way we think and do 
business.”  Nordé and Williams also agree that choice and alternatives, in theory, are desired.  
Roberts has made it clear that “the war is over” between publics and charters.  He wants to 
“work collaboratively with other people who will charter, and make sure we educate kids in the 
city of Detroit.”   
However, some key players in Detroit and education reform are still nervous about 
accepting charters into their public school system.  To them, the charter movement threatens 
public schooling.  McLean’s opinion reflects the opinion that the Detroit community held when 
charters were first entering the city: that the charters “pull away from the… population base of 
public schools” which forces the publics to recruit to “maintain some of the services that they 
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need to have.”  The charter schools mean that the public district has to work harder to recruit and 
retain students so that they can remain open.  Charters, in this view, exacerbate the financial 
troubles of the district. 
Moje’s worry was that charters “take away from the mission of public education.”  She, 
Roop, Rankin, and Khumbah argued that there is a selection bias in who gets into charters.  
Families that have more interest in their child’s education, know how to find an alternative, and 
have the transportation to do so, get their kids into charters.  Moje said that in this way charter 
schools “manage to be quite selective in who and how people are admitted and who stays.”  This 
means that the students who are most in need are the ones left behind in the public schools.  
“You start to see these differences in the populations of the two groups, and that might explain 
differences in outcomes” (Moje).  Khumbah argued that if charters ever score better than publics 
it’s because they “cream up” the best students from the general population. 
So when Williams reflected that a positive aspect of charters is that they have better 
parent participation, this could also be seen as a negative for public schools.  The publics, as 
opposed to the charters, cannot be selective.  They have a mandate to “take an average Joe on the 
street and make the best of them… Whether [their] parent is a church minister, a drug addict, a 
janitor, whatever they are” (Khumbah).  Nordé is proud of what the publics offer students: 
special education, options for deaf students, vocational programs, magnet schools, that the 
charter network does not.  Khumbah knows the difficulty of this and this makes him proud.  He 
thinks that considering “how much they do, in that context, they need to be acknowledged and 
valued and encouraged as opposed to bashed at after not doing anything good.”  
 The picture painted of charter schools, from my interviews with knowledgeable figures 
throughout education reform in Detroit, is a negative one.  There is a lack of standards and a lack 
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of evidence in Detroit and across the nation that says charters schools are on a whole better.  But 
I believe in the possibilities that can come with some charter schools: whether that is the simple 
ideal of diversity, or the sometimes necessary financial relief for the district, or the possibility of 
new ideas or vigor.  Done in the right way, following the tools for successful reform, I think the 
consequences can be minimized and the gains maximized.   
First, as highlighted above, we cannot generalize charters as successful or not: as Roberts 
understands we need to be constantly evaluating what is working or not working at the site level 
of every school.  It is not the type of operator running a school, it is what they are doing that is 
working that matters.  As Moje said, “It’s really not about needing more charters, it's about 
needing more schools that do the things that leading charter schools are doing! And public 
schools could do those things.”  Bringing in fresh ideas may teach even the old dogs some new 
tricks.   
 There needs to be agreed upon and transparent standards for charters, new and old, just as 
Roberts promised he was creating.  When we spoke, Roberts did not explicitly share what his 
standards will be as the district slowly lets in new charters and possibly removes some.  After 
hearing the worries about for-profit charter schools, I think that it is Robert’s job, as protector of 
Detroit’s students and a symbol of honest finances, to make it the standard that charters must be 
non-profit.  The schools should also share a common core with the Detroit public schools in 
order to offer increased stability.  Offering quality professional development for their teachers 
should also be a necessity in every charter (and public).  Giving these supports to new teachers, 
who may truly be vigorous and passionate teachers, will further help them succeed even if there 
are not enough veteran teachers to emulate. 
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 The process of inviting in new charters should remain as slow as Roberts has initiated.  
There should also be the option of new charters building up their grades slowly, inviting in a new 
grade of students each year in order to create they culture they may deem beneficial.  As Roberts 
is beginning to do as well, lines of communication should always remain open between charters 
and publics.  I think these could also be opened further to include the Higher Education- DPS 
Consortium.  When it comes to new ideas for teaching students, these universities have plenty of 
passion, expertise, ideas, and even time and money to spend improving the schools in Detroit.  
The call for communication and activism from these universities needs to be raised loud and 
clear.  As Khumbah said on the issue of demanding university involvement, “if you hoist a small 
flag, its a small flag.  If you hoist a strong flag and try to sink it deep, it makes a bigger 
difference.”   
 Lastly, with new ideas coming in to Detroit, the existing public schools need to be 
supported and recognized.  There are publics in Detroit that are currently doing new and 
successful things.  The existing public schools can be a part of the innovation and choice in 
Detroit: offering the things that they have that are unique.  Their mandate to teach all students 
has required the public system to create diverse options that are important to offer all students of 
Detroit.  The district should also work to make these diverse schooling options transparent and 
available to all families in Detroit.  One of the largest concerns with charters was that they only 
benefitted the families that were knowledgeable enough to chose them even though the 
underlying theory behind choice is that all should students get it, especially students struggling in 
the traditional education system.  Showing the differences and strengths of each school 
transparently and clearly to every family, and giving them the power to choose, may increase 
their interest and pride in the district and their school.  Hopefully these families, the district, and 
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all other actors can embrace what the schools in Detroit are doing well, new and old, charter and 
public, even if they have not yet reached the overall success demanded of them. 
 
  
Detroit Context 
This thesis has examined both the theoretical side as well as the case by case, in-practice 
side of the EFM position and charter schools, considering the positives and negatives.  What we 
have not considered however, are the systemic challenges that are not addressed by bringing in 
an EFM or different types of schools.  The school district sits within a context of these 
widespread, and deeply rooted problems.  In Khumbah’s words, in the scope of these societal 
problems plaguing the schools, a “charter school or Emergency Manager [won’t] change 
anything” (Khumbah).  Analyzing the systemic problems that surround the educational reform 
initiatives in Detroit, there emerged three categories of crises.  Detroit is in an economic crisis, in 
a social crisis, and thirdly, in a “fluctuation” crisis.   
It is important to understand systemic problems, how current reforms can or 
cannot address them, and then what possible reforms could improve them.  I hope that 
through the following brief exploration of the three types of crises that I see in Detroit and some 
quick suggestions for improvement, it is clear that the tool of considering context is important.  
Although using this tool involves looking at larger blanket problems and reform, we need to 
remember not to generalize.  As a part of this, do not put blanket blame on Detroiters for the 
problems in the city and schools, but at the same time, do not lower expectations of actors 
in Detroit, because this in itself will only harm them further.   
Looking at the first of the three types of crises that affect Detroit’s schools, McLean saw 
the poor “economic status of not only the district, but the state of Michigan” as a major challenge 
for the schools.  This economic crisis in Detroit and its causes are deep and system-wide.  In 
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Detroit itself, there is a lack of a tax base because people are leaving Detroit as a “gush out in 
every direction” (Roop).  This outflow leaves only the poorest within a city with an extremely 
high unemployment rate and low property values, which makes it almost impossible for the 
schools to raise funds.  At a state level, as Roop said, “the system of funding education in 
Michigan is broken.”  Because of the disparity in per pupil investment across the state, Khumbah 
argued, “you can only get [a] disparity in outcomes.”  Because the “financial support systems” 
are not equitable, McLean said, Detroit struggles “to support the teaching and learning process.” 
The Detroit EFM has to work within the context of this chronic and systemic poor 
economic situation.  In Laura Roop’s eyes, Roberts’ role is only a “band-aid at the place of the 
greatest hemorrhage,” no matter how effective he is at his job.  Cuban suggests that the successes 
of all long-term superintendents are dependent on the time and location in which they are placed 
(2010).  The power and passion of each individual matter, but the context is a large factor of 
whether an individual is labeled a hero or a failure (Cuban, 2010).  All-star leaders in all urban 
districts, Cuban argued, face an environment that limits change and creates conflicts (Cuban, 
2010).   
Cuban argues that a leader can be successful only when he or she understands that “they 
cannot permanently… solve all problems with the resources they have, particularly when the 
goal is to turn around chronically low-performing, high-poverty schools and keep them turned 
around” (emphasis added) (2010, p. 144-145).  Successful leaders know that their reform will be 
limited and know how to cope with the dilemmas that will arise (Cuban, 2010).  In Detroit’s 
case, the EFM has to accept that he can only bandage certain financial problems.  We cannot 
expect perfection, but overall, Roberts seems to be effectively doing the jobs that the limited role 
of EFM was intended to address.  
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It will take a systemic effort to change the underlying economic environment in which 
Detroit sits.  In order to increase living standards and lift the Detroit community up from a “poor 
community to maybe a middle class [one]” (Khumbah), our state and our country must make it a 
priority.  So far, the state has implemented a district level solution, the EFM, but this does not fix 
the underlying economic struggle in Detroit.  Khumbah spoke about how Wall Street hurt the 
whole country, but the government bailed them out and let them keep working, while in Detroit 
they just appointed an EFM.  This is a national system that chose its priorities, he said, and they 
are clearly backward. 
Changing the system of funding across our country would be another systemic solution.  
The state of Michigan is just a “perverse version” of this national problem of inequitable 
funding, Roop argued.  McLean thinks that all schools should have equitable funding “be it 
federal, be it state, be it local.”  He further suggested that “once funding is given with equity… at 
least 80% should go directly where children are.”   
The second type of crisis in Detroit is a social one.  Seven of the ten interviewees 
mentioned social problems as one of the “major challenges” facing Detroit schools today. The 
factors contributing to the overall social crisis include poverty, lack of healthcare, divorce and 
difficult family arrangements, emotional and physical abuse, and lack of role models.  Although 
these challenges plague most urban districts and “apply to the state and really the country,” they 
“play out in the most devastating ways in areas like Detroit” (Platte).  Specifically though, these 
factors of social crisis affect families and thus students and their ability to come to school and be 
engaged.  In McLean’s words, these factors decrease students’ “school readiness.”   
Roberts understands that “when a kid in our system is worried about if they can have 
breakfast… if their clothes aren’t clean… It really takes a unique person to be able to connect 
! #)(!
with that young person and move them to the next level.”  The three interviewees that are or 
have been closest with the students of Detroit—Williams, McLean, and Rankin—all mentioned 
the difficulty of teaching students in this environment and that “parenting” (Williams), “student 
readiness” (McLean), and “social issues” (Rankin) were major challenges in Detroit.   
All three teachers gave examples of how these things made it difficult for students to 
learn.  Rankin explained that the social issues kids are faced with lead to student “frustration” 
with school, hostility in order to protect oneself, poor attendance, and dropping out of school. 
“When kids are dealin’ with that kind of drama,” and “there's so many people in their houses and 
so much noise goin’ on and cursin’ and drinkin’ and smokin’ and this and that…how do I expect 
them to sit there and concentrate on reading a book?” wonders Williams.  Another setback 
teachers have to work around is a lack of parent involvement because “many times parents in the 
urban setting… didn't have a good experience with education so they stay away from the school.  
They don't really want anything to do with the teachers sometimes” (Williams). 
McLean says that today, there is “a lack of children being ready to learn.  Before they 
even enter school.”  This is not just the fault of the child’s mom and dad but the fault of the 
whole community of adults is not “helping parents keep children in check.”  As a result, children 
do not know how to “live sociably with other people in a civil manner,” which is disruptive in 
school.   
In a struggling urban city like Detroit, Khumbah says students already “start with a step 
behind.”  This step behind is a result of the poor social and economic environment the kids are 
in.  Because of this environment, whether an urban school is chartered or public does not matter: 
students will still fail.  Platte says that around the nation, poor students are failing in publics and 
charters alike.  In her words, “what we see in the national data is mirrored in Michigan as a 
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whole and in DPS in particular… Do a scatter plot laying out student achievement in all these 
schools, and you'll see there's some doing really well and some doing poorly and that generally 
the line follows the percentage of kids who are poor.”  
Even in the face of these social problems, Rankin believes that effective teachers can 
work around the students’ social problems and reach extremely high academic outcomes.  And I 
want to emphasize the fact that Rankin has seen huge success.  Rankin has helped his students 
reach high levels of achievement through his deep understanding of students’ experiences, his 
passion, and his determination to prove to them that “God has made everyone with a capacity for 
understanding.”  He aims to surprise them with their own talents and success in the classroom.  I 
believe that understanding the social problems each student faces, staring those in the face, and 
then being determined to teach through that, is a powerful and doable thing.  His success with 
math workshops convinces me that reforming how teachers work with students is a viable and 
effective place to implement reform.    
On the other end, both Williams and McLean want parents to make some changes as 
well.  Both interviewees seemed like extremely high quality teachers, but they still thought that 
for them to help their students be more successful in school, some things have to change at the 
community level.  Their suggestions represent the point of view that Cuban (2010) labeled as 
“Improved Schools and Community.”  When I asked Williams what her solution would be, she 
said that she “would like to see more parent accountability in some way… in our district, doing 
something to parents who don't send their kids to school… Even if you're not gonna do anything 
else, at least get them here.”  She also suggested more support for parents because “every parent 
loves their child and wants the best for their child. But, unfortunately, sometimes they don't 
know what's best for their child.” 
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McLean believes that there need to “be expectations for parents to ensure that their child 
or children are school ready.”  He specifically offered suggestions on how the “family 
community” needs to come together to help the children.  McLean said that a child’s family 
should be “follow[ing]-up at home” with that student.  Then, at school, the teacher…and the 
administration and the counselors… all the support people” have that same “expectation and that 
enthusiasm and that passion” that the community and family have.  The result is “community 
based supports: you get the community people talking more positively, they're volunteering to 
support the schools.”  In this environment, “a child can't lose because even when he wants to go 
left or right… he can't get off the track.” 
Creating parent groups, like past Detroit Public Schools CEO Kenneth Burnley did in 
2004, could be a good first step to making the improvements that Williams and McLean 
identified.  An “Office of Parent Community Liaisons” like Burnley created could help get 
parents involved with their students and schools.   
Detroit’s third type of crisis is what I am calling a fluctuation crisis: a state of instability 
and movement, including constant reforms, in which kids get lost and adults find personal gain.  
Sometimes adults are working diligently to create solutions, but other times, they may try “to do 
something that might be of value personally” (Khumbah).  Roop worried about contractors 
“swarming like vultures around the schools” trying to make money.  The district is in a place of 
fluctuation that harms its students in many ways. 
Roop, again, considered charter schools a band-aid, a limited tool to reducing some of the 
bleeding, because they will not offer stable change in Detroit.  Roop said that charter schools are 
neither sustainable nor scalable as the effort grows in Detroit.  Ravitch clarified this point in her 
book, writing “what is stunningly successful in a small setting, nurtured by its founders and 
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brought to life by a cadre of passionate teachers, seldom survives the transition when it is turned 
into a large-scale reform” (2010, p. 146).  Roop considers charters a “partial strategy” because 
moving too quickly, as has been happening across the nation, will cause the quality to suffer.   
Charters in Detroit are also further splitting the school district up into pieces.  Roop 
talked about what she called an attempt to break the district into a ‘portfolio district,’ a piece of 
which would be the charter school network.  Creating a portfolio district requires “chopp[ing] it 
up,” in this case into three different districts with a different person running each chunk (Roop).  
The other two pieces besides the charter schools would be the public schools and then the 
poorest performing schools that are being set aside for the EAS.  In Detroit, Roop speculated that 
Doug Ross, who currently runs a successful network of charter schools called University Prep, 
would be responsible for the charters.  Karen Ridgeway, the current superintendent, would be in 
charge of the public schools, and John Covington would remain the leader of the EAA and the 
worst schools in Detroit (Roop).  Roop said that there is no evidence that portfolio districts work 
(Saltman, 2010).  In her mind, they just add to the state of fluctuation. 
Roberts is currently in the middle of these three pieces.  He hired Ridgeway, but is also 
on the EAA working closely with Covington, is filling the EFM position, and is communicating 
between the public schools and charter schools.  When I asked about the biggest solutions he was 
working on or wanted to work on in the future, he brought up his responsibilities to the EAA.  
When Roberts talked about his responsibilities to the school district, he summarized three pieces 
in this quote: “I have to run this system to make sure we manage the budget, make sure we do 
everything we said we were gonna do at the academic side, with challenging course work for the 
students, and I have to make sure that we continue to engineer and put EAA in place.”   
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Overall, having passionate and intelligent people focusing on each piece, all united 
underneath someone who has all three in mind is a good thing.  All of the pieces can be 
examined and communicated back and forth.  This is just another instance in which the EFM 
position is a key way to offer the necessary stability in leadership as well as open up lines of 
communication and collaboration.  The EMF and his team just need to remember Cuban’s 
advice, and my own takeaway from the beginning of this section on context, that leaders should 
not forget how deeply rooted the challenges in Detroit are and, as a result, should not 
underestimate how difficult it will be to make drastic change.  I worry that, because Roberts’ job 
is self-described as “juggling a lot of balls while you drive down the road,” he will have 
insufficient time and energy to focus on every issue as well as the financial pieces that he is in 
charge of.   
Charter school openings coupled with public school closures are also a source of constant 
change for students who are moved from school to school.  When Ravitch (2010) wrote about 
the charter school push in NYC, she noted how some of the neediest students were lost in the 
shuffle as student populations were moved from school to school.  This possibility needs to be 
addressed in Detroit and monitored very closely.  Moving slowly and making transitions between 
closing schools and opening schools transparent and easy for families is a positive first step 
toward creating stability.  Having someone or a team of people to watch out specifically for these 
kids is also a necessity.  Conveniently, Detroit Public Schools are already beginning to do this, 
partially in response to the overall poor attendance levels.  In the 2010-2011 school year, the 
average Detroit high school student missed over 28 days of school (Abramson, 2012).  The 
school district has began offering parent workshops and sending attendance agents to homes to 
strongly remind parents to send their children to school (Abramson, 2012).  This is exactly what 
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Williams suggested as a way to get parents to be more helpful, and it will help make sure 
students do not get lost in the flux of moving schools. 
Another factor that could be improved to help students more easily get to their new 
schools and attend school every day is the busing and public transportation system in Detroit.  
Moje said that transportation is one of the biggest challenges in Detroit because “there's no 
busing available, so [students] have to take public transportation.  Public transportation is 
completely unreliable.  So the kids are late!”  When the students are late, they miss valuable 
teaching time and disrupt the classroom when they come in.  This is an instability within the 
system that a reliable educational transportation system could improve. 
Another thing that could create stability in the classroom, as offered as a suggestion in the 
charter school section, is offering a common core curriculum in every school in Detroit.  Nordé 
and Mirel see the lack of a common core as a huge weakness among charters.  As Roberts is 
making a concerted effort to create a united, communicating district of public schools and charter 
schools together, he needs to create curriculum standards across the district.  Teachers like 
Williams know exactly what is working and why and that advice can be put into action to help 
offer stability for students who are moved around within the district.   
Constant teacher turnover is another instability.  This came up in the discussion of charter 
schools but is a concern in all types of Detroit schools.  Moje brought up that one of the major 
challenges in Detroit is the “routine practice of pink-slipping all teachers and… that's just not 
great for stability, for building a sense of faith and trust in your employer… compromises the 
possibility that the teaching will be at the highest levels.”  Fortunately, Moje reported, “the 
current administration is really trying to change that.  They wanna have teachers in place …[and] 
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engaged in professional development well before school starts.”  Hopefully this vision becomes a 
stable reality. 
 Many interviewees suggested professional development and training to further help 
teachers teach at consistently high levels and stay in the classroom, both of which would help 
students find stability.  Platte, whose focus is completely on research and evaluation, reminded 
me that “just evaluating teachers doesn't make them better.”  What is really going to help 
teachers in this struggling system, she said, are “systematic ways to get at teacher learning and 
development.  So that could be professional development, that could be partnering with school 
reform agencies… like Success for All.”  Roop brought up a current professional development 
program called Reading Apprenticeship for which Michigan is currently a scale-up state.  If high 
school teams from Detroit participated, they would get free professional development and use it 
“as an opening for getting—improving teaching and learning” (Roop). 
 Roop also brought up the possibility of Michigan colleges and universities working 
directly with their own “little cluster systems… elementary, middle school, high school.”  The 
partnering universities would share their projects and results with their fellow universities 
(Roop).  This reminds me of the original concept of charter schools: having the place and 
freedom for teachers to test out new ideas for improving education.  Partnering in this way also 
involves the key tool of cooperation and communication and would get universities involved. 
 Through my interviews with other actors in Detroit and at the University of Michigan, I 
heard other ideas about cooperation between local universities and the Detroit schools.  To create 
the professional development that Mirel believes is a critical part to the common core 
curriculum, he thinks that Detroit “would have to work very closely with educators at Wayne 
State and U of M and MSU, to get teachers up to the point where they can actually teach a 
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rigorous, content-rich discipline-based content-rich curriculum.” Moje and Nordé had 
suggestions: almost identical ideas about cooperation between universities and Detroit schools to 
get college students and younger students together.   
 Moje brought up the fact that lower income students do not have the same opportunities 
as other children over the breaks from school: winter break and especially over the summer.  It is 
during these times when they fall farther behind their less disadvantaged peers.  Moje cited the 
growing push toward extended day and extended year models that aim to remedy this.  These 
models maintain “regular holidays to which so many people are committed” but also offer what 
Moje and colleagues at the University of Michigan are calling “intercessions.” “The kids are on 
break, but we offer instruction.  Maybe it's enrichment, maybe it's regular instruction, maybe it's 
making up something that they missed, but that's an opportunity for teachers to continue 
teaching-they don't have to take the break if they don't want to, but they can also have the break.” 
Moje specifically sees the possibility of getting undergraduate students involved with 
these intercessions throughout the year.  For example, “we could bring undergraduate students 
who are dance majors… to run a dance camp with kids at a middle school” (Moje).  These 
college students can offer the opportunities that not every family can afford.  It would be good 
for university students because they “give a community a service [and] they could get service 
learning credits for it… there are all sorts of ways that they can get compensated without it 
having to cost money” (Moje).  These intercessions would also be another way to educate the 
students in the School of Education at Michigan, says Moje: “it's a little lower stakes activity, but 
it's still rewarding and enriching for the [education students].”   She says that the intercessions 
are “another resource for staffing… the certified teacher can be off having a vacation and our in-
service or pre-service teachers are learning how to be teachers in this intercession.” 
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The Detroit students are not only getting these new opportunities but they are also 
building what Moje calls “pipeline mediators.”  For many of the Detroit kids, they may be the 
first in their family to go to college and these intercessions at the University of Michigan would 
allow them to see “people they wouldn't normally get to see. They're seeing people who go to 
college” who are “young and hip and fun” (Moje).  Moje said that this would be even more 
effective if the intercessions happened consistently.  The current system of visiting the campus 
once a year starting in middle school “does not help a person go to college.” 
Nordé already had a similar idea in mind and is putting it into action this summer.  She is 
getting a program from Texas to come run a three-week engineering summer camp to get 
elementary students excited about classroom math.  The mentors will be college students from 
that program (Nordé).  Both Moje and Nordé know that programs need to get at younger students 
and get them involved consistently each year.  Nordé’s concern is the fact that her district starts 
losing students in grade three.  She hopes that real-life experiences will be something for 
students to get passionate about, something to get them to stay focused in school. 
 In the future, I hope that it is not Texas coming in at the request from a school leader in 
Detroit: I hope it is a college in Michigan partnering with Detroit schools to mutually help them 
both.  These are places where the DPS Consortium can be a key player and I urge the 
Consortium to consider these, pull out the biggest flag they have, and get started.  
I see these solutions –intercessions and professional development and innovation all in 
partnership with Detroit and universities like the University of Michigan—as the epitome of 
collaboration for the better.  This is the communication that is necessary today. 
A new type of communication is emerging, different than the old, but possibly bigger and 
better.  As discussed, the coalitions of Detroit’s past are broken and increasingly autocratic 
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positions of leadership in the district have made it harder for community members to form 
coalitions and create change.  The new way of creating change involves cooperation in different 
places: unifying all the levels of actors, vertically and horizontally, instead of unifying the 
masses. 
The foundation for this new type of cooperation is the growing involvement of the 
Federal Government, which began in the late 1900s (Mirón & St. John, 2003).  From 1964 
though 1981, the government got involved with Title I and afterwards they began setting 
standards for our national education system (Mirón & St. John, 2003).  This thesis has reflected 
upon how the resulting national movements have shaped education reform across the United 
States as well as the role of EFM and the charter schools push in Detroit.  McLean believes that 
this attention on education will continue and grow, that there has been a “refocus on education 
being a priority in America” even more recently with our current President Barack Obama and 
his Department of Education.  
This growing federal involvement brings with it a reimagining of education itself (Roop).  
“Until a country makes education of its people the priority, it will never be in good competition 
with the world” (McLean).  We need to make sure that all people understand that education is 
increasingly becoming a priority in this country and should be (McLean).  McLean argued that 
the many of us who are “locked into yesteryear,” need to “recognize that things change [and] we 
have to rethink how we're gonna do things, especially around education.”  This national 
involvement and rethinking and getting everyone committed together will be the new way of 
education reform. 
Looking at the categories of “most influential reform actors,” this new cooperation sits in 
the “All” column.  This category means that no one is wrong in whom they think the best actors 
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for making reform are.  Instead, every single column is pivotal and must get involved to create 
long-term systemic change.  What we need, said McLean, are “expectations and accountability 
for all stakeholders…. We're talking about not only teachers on the personal level, we're talking 
about administrators at all level of administration, we're talking about parents, we're talking 
about community-based school systems, the community at large in support of the education to 
make it a priority, we're talking about the state of Michigan as a stakeholder, making sure that 
this district is operating. And we're talking about even the federal government making education 
a priority.”  
We can see the playing out of this new powerful cooperation in this thesis’ case study of 
Detroit.  As the federal government got involved in educational initiatives, national movements 
grew and slowly affected the Detroit’s schools.  Charter schools entered the scene, the state got 
more involved, and the centralized EFM position was created.  For years, Detroit has been 
grappling with the reality that the charter schools endorsed by the nation are not inherently better 
quality than public schools.  The community of Detroit struggled against an outside force that put 
them under the control of a businessman.  The best practice of the past—getting coalitions 
together to change the direction of the schools—was diminished.  But Detroit has begun to 
realize how to work with these new reforms; integrating their charters while working to ensure 
quality, cooperation, and innovation; gaining stability from an EFM while still staying involved 
in the reform process.  Detroit is ready to continue getting every passionate actor involved in 
reimagining the education in their school district. 
Conclusions on Detroit Education Reform 
There are many lessons to learn from the successes and failures of Detroit schools’ past 
and present reforms.  Through the timeline of this thesis—from the long-ago past up through a 
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consideration of how things may be changing in the future—the focus has been on the role of 
EFM and the charter school push in order to unify our analysis.  Examining the strengths, 
weaknesses, and possible improvements of the EFM position, has revealed the importance of 
collaboration with actors at every level in the system in creating buy-in while still efficiently 
enacting reform.  This cooperation together must strike a balance between centralized and 
decentralized control.  Transparent input and feedback needs to travel from the community, 
teachers, and educational administrators to the EFM and back.  The EFM needs to work laterally 
with charter school leaders, the EAA, the superintendent, and even city officials.  The charter 
school movement must be based on the cooperation between charters and publics to support the 
existing strengths of every school and bring new ideas to every school.  Together, the schools of 
Detroit, possibly along with the universities in Michigan, can begin creating standards and high 
quality through the district.   
These current initiatives reflect how important the tools of reform presented throughout 
this thesis are.  First, as Detroit moves forward, its reformists cannot forget to look at the 
complex and deep context around their education system.  There are deep systemic crises that 
must be addressed by every related actor and with every tool.  As a part of examining the context 
of Detroit schools, the lessons from the district’s past cannot be ignored, even as Detroit, its 
schools, and the nature of education reform change.   
From this history, the successes and failures of Detroit’s past actors have left us a legacy 
of warnings and advice:  The goal of reform must be to help students learn, even though adults 
are the ones with the power.  Upholding a well-supported identity as well as using nonpartisan 
research help actors gain legitimacy.  The tool of evaluation and research has only become more 
important as national movements and hype grow and spread in America.  Evaluating old and new 
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reforms will ensure that Detroit implements only the most effective ones.  This research and the 
transparent sharing of data will, in turn, increase support and cooperation in our education 
system.  
Through time, the theme of cooperation has been a constant in Detroit, even if it has 
changed slightly along the way.  This cooperation requires transparency, communication, and 
input from every actor in order to create and implement reform in any location within the 
education system.  The Detroit schools are in a systemic crisis that runs deeper than one reform 
or one group of actors can fix.  In this context, considering every tool, actor, and place of 
implementation is critical.  By getting every actor in Detroit and in the United States to make 
improving education a priority, deep positive and stable reform will be made.   
 There has been a legacy of reform in Detroit, and now, as our education system is 
changing, that legacy will come to fruition.  Detroit schools must join hands with actors in their 
city, their schools, their state, and their nation to improve and expand the focus of existing 
reforms.  Their resulting systemic solutions will begin to help students and improve their 
educational outcomes, the goal all along.   
 !!!!!!!
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Takeaways !
National Context 
- National movements are powerful because they are what is “in,” not necessarily because 
they are what is best for the students of America 
- Credibility, support, and objective review: three necessary pieces to creating support for 
reforms 
- For a solution to work, it must improve what happens between students and teachers 
- There are many pieces of a great education that are extremely important that cannot be 
measured by numbers 
Detroit’s History 
1919-1929 
- Having support and consensus from many constituents is vital for implementing reform 
- Not only can school districts learn from their own past, but from the experiences of other 
similar school districts 
- Move slowly with new reforms and research them.  Conducting and reporting objective 
research is an important tool for acquiring the credibility and legitimacy by which efforts 
gain support and buy-in 
1929-1940 
- We must measure reform in how it improves teaching and learning 
- It cannot be forgotten that schools are created to serve the student, not the voters 
- Removing the extremities in their organization’s identity, allowed them to gain 
legitimacy 
- Do not forget the foundation and history of the teachers’ unions 
1940-1949 
- Do not underestimate the determination and the goals of each player.  To do this requires 
policy-makers to understand that different stakeholders may be looking out for 
themselves and not the students 
- A lack of money is not the sole cause of dissent and disagreement within a system 
- Coalitions of voters are powerful in creating education change in Detroit 
- National movements are not necessarily what is best for our children 
1949-1964 
- Transparency between board members and the board (as well as other governing and 
decision making bodies) and the community is extremely important 
- We cannot forget and assume that our solutions can only be skin deep 
- Opening the issue up to research and input from community members introduces new 
non-partisan, student-minded options and gains the support of the community 
1964-1981 
- Maintain your most mainstream identity in order to gather the largest support 
- Focus on the middle grounds, to get different groups to support your position, while 
removing extremely radical identities 
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- Factions need to realize the most important goal—improving the education of students in 
the classroom—and understand the differences in where the others are coming from in 
order to come together to reach that goal 
- Get an objective examination and solution that multiple parties can trust 
- Make sure that the outcomes of our initiatives match up directly with the original goals of 
that change 
1981-1999 
- The media has immense power over public opinion and can cause huge success or 
damage for education reformers 
- Leaders of education reform, especially in Detroit, cannot ignore the power of the 
teachers’ unions or expect cooperation 
- The unions need to be willing to be more flexible and open minded 
1999-2002 
- Collaboration at the state and administrative level is still needed 
- Cooperation balances the system, making reforms pass more agreeably 
Process of Reform 
- As you create, implement, or evaluate any education reform, ask yourself what pieces of 
the process (actors, tools, places) you (and/or the creator of the reform) currently are 
deeming as most important.  Then look again, consider every piece in the process, and 
evaluate which ones you should be deeming as most important. 
Emergency Financial Manager 
- Whoever acts as EFM should understand that the EFM needs to maintain an 
appropriately sized budget to allow the schools to stay afloat, as well as reduce the 
financial corruption within the school district 
- This business and finance experience and perspective is necessary for the jobs that the 
EFM is required to do 
- The autocratic nature of the EMF position could protect the district from constant 
turnover and allow change to be made more efficiently 
- Buy-in can be lost at all levels—individual community members and families, teachers, 
and administrators—and when it is, serious harm has been done 
- The more an EFM truly knows about Detroit before coming in, the faster and more 
effective they are at their work and representing the Detroit community and gaining their 
support 
- The EFM (or leader of the system) needs to have experience in the classroom and with 
education or at least refer heavily to those on the academic side of things 
- Do not forget that changing the person holding the same exact role can vastly change the 
reality of that position. 
- Having the skills to effectively work with existing local employees is a key factor in 
creating successful buy-in. 
- A part of being welcomed in as a leader, is not bringing in outsiders to do the inside jobs 
Charter Schools 
- Charter schools on average are not better than publics, the governance of charter schools 
does not inherently make them better schools, and there is no quality control among 
charters and there needs to be 
- Research, data, and standards are necessary when it comes to charter schools 
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- Hopefully, slowing the process of charter growth will allow high quality charters to take 
root in Detroit 
Context 
- It is important to understand systemic problems, how current reforms can or cannot 
address them, then what possible reforms could improve them 
- Do not put blanket blame on Detroiters for the problems in the city and schools, but at the 
same time, do not lower expectations of actors in Detroit, because this in itself will only 
harm them further 
Appendix B: Partial Chart of Interviewee’s Responses 
 
Charter Schools Emergency Financial Manager   
Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative 
 
Roy 
Roberts 
 •+No longer 
a fight 
between 
Detroit 
publics and 
charters 
•++Agreeme
nt on 
standards 
from charters 
and when 
they are 
failing 
•+Getting 
cooperation 
about 
standards 
•Slowing 
down to 
insure quality 
•Some 
charters are 
better, some 
worse 
•Need to 
identify how 
large the 
market is 
•No 
conclusive 
findings 
whether 
charters are 
better than 
publics.   
•Taking the 
cap off 
charters= 
wild wild 
west 
•I stopped 
people 
stealing 
money 
•+My role 
offers 
stability (as 
compared to 
in the past) 
•+I’ve done 
what no one 
else did: 
reduce the 
deficit to 
$89M in 6 
months 
•+Business 
acumen 
•Power over 
all schools 
(public and 
charter) 
•+I 
personally 
care about 
kids 
•I have 
authority but 
won’t 
necessarily 
use it (I still 
want to 
communicate
) 
 •Elected 
officials get 
fired (often) 
for political 
reasons 
(because they 
are elected 
and fired by 
changing 
political 
constituents) 
 
Roy 
Roberts 
•+No longer 
a fight 
between 
Detroit 
publics and 
charters 
•++Agreeme
•Some 
charters are 
better, some 
worse 
•Need to 
identify how 
large the 
•No 
conclusive 
findings 
whether 
charters are 
better than 
publics.   
•I stopped 
people 
stealing 
money 
•+My role 
offers 
stability (as 
 •Elected 
officials get 
fired (often) 
for political 
reasons 
(because they 
are elected 
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Irene 
Nordé 
•Good places 
with 
passionate 
people 
•Offer 
something 
different from 
publics 
•+Smaller, 
more 
personal 
•Less cost 
because no 
union 
(staffing 
costs=biggest 
part of 
budgets) 
 •Public 
schools have 
some services 
that charters 
don’t have 
(special ed, 
vocational, 
magnet 
schools) 
•-No quality 
control 
•No 
curriculum 
•- Outdated 
materials 
•-Lack of 
support  
(all vs 
publics) 
•Some new 
professional 
development 
they didn’t 
have before 
•Roberts 
knows 
Detroit 
•Proven CEO 
of company 
•+Knows 
how to work 
with and 
support 
employees 
•Doesn’t 
micromanage 
•++Checking 
and watching 
finances 
 •We need 
EFM to 
create 
appropriate 
budged 
because past 
school district 
did not  
•Old EMF 
took over 
everything 
•Cut math 
department 
•Brought his 
own close 
circle in for 
jobs 
Walter 
McLean 
 
•Wherever 
students can 
learn should 
be accepted 
•Schools that 
use data on 
student 
performance 
(not just from 
tests) 
•Both 
charters and 
publics are at 
fault for 
students not 
learning 
•Some doing 
well, some 
not 
•State 
initiatives= 
more charters 
(they’re not 
going away) 
•Public 
schools will 
never be gone 
•Same 
students, 
same 
curriculum 
•Takes 
students from 
public 
district! 
district has to 
recruit and 
retain to offer 
services 
•If students 
aren’t 
learning 
•No data says 
charters are 
better than 
publics 
•Roberts’ 
beliefs and 
approach 
•Put systems 
of effective 
district back 
•People who 
know this 
work (know 
culture, goals 
of learning, 
how to 
conduct 
reviews, can 
do something 
about it 
•Why was 
EFM 
necessary? 
(What 
systems 
broken, what 
wasn’t 
systematic? 
What best 
practices 
weren’t being 
sustained?) 
• -Short-term 
leaders lack 
positive 
continuity: 
must redo 
culture with 
each 
leadership 
Vienna 
Williams 
 •Charters get 
better parent 
participation  
•Choices are 
good  
•Publics have 
common 
open core 
now 
•-Charters 
being pushed 
as better 
(when 
research says 
they’re not) 
•Charters 
•+Catching 
financial 
misuse 
(checks and 
balances) 
•EFM can do 
this because 
 •Business 
cuts are 
different from 
making cuts 
in schools  
•Unless 
you’ve 
! F!
Jerry 
Rankin 
•There are 
some good 
charters 
 •Parents 
don’t know 
difference 
•Charters 
know how to 
make money 
(exploit head 
count) 
•Not 
delivering as 
well as DPS  
•No emphasis 
on quality of 
teachers 
•High teacher 
turnover rate 
•Exploitation 
of kids with 
greatest need 
•EFM helps 
solve 
previous 
problem: no 
accountabilit
y; much 
financial 
fraud; 
exploitation 
of kids 
•Roberts is 
sincere, has 
integrity 
•Roberts and 
Bobb have a 
business 
mind to stop 
financial 
waste 
 •Challenge: 
business 
culture vs. 
culture of 
educators 
Laura 
Roop 
 
•+High 
quality, non-
profit charters 
•++Doug 
Ross/Univers
ity Prep: 
Policy 
background, 
business 
offer, proof 
of quality 
 •--Not a 
scalable 
strategy 
(doesn’t 
reach all kids, 
scale up too 
fast and 
quality 
suffers) 
•Free for 
all! huge 
variance in 
quality 
•No system 
analysis 
•Portfolio 
district: no 
evidence this 
works, harder 
politically 
•-Extracting 
capital 
(contractors) 
in flux 
•Students lost 
in flux 
•+Ability to 
analyze data 
and cut debt 
•Roberts 
knows 
Detroit and 
MI 
•Closing 
schools had 
to be done 
•We need 
fresh ideas 
outside of MI 
•Doesn’t 
acknowledge 
how broken 
MI ed system 
is 
•band-aid at 
place of 
greatest 
hemorrhage 
•EAS, 
Covington 
Nkem 
Khumba
h 
 •Charters are 
trying to do a 
public good, 
we should 
accept them 
as part of the 
fabric 
••Detroit in 
crisis! 
opportunity 
for solution 
and profit 
(economic 
based, 
•-Profit 
component 
(few 
individuals 
making 
money) must 
be contained  
  •EFM is not 
an educator 
•Creating a 
corporate 
mentality in a 
public field 
•-Like a 
! FE!
 
Elizabet
h Moje 
•Democratic 
nation: we 
have a right 
to open 
schools 
•Stimulators: 
change the 
way we think 
and do 
business 
 •--Detract 
from mission 
of public ed 
•-Selective 
about student 
population 
•-
generalizing 
across the 
board 
(“charters are 
better”) 
•Chartering 
doesn’t=succ
ess 
•Be attuned 
to people 
involved with 
ed and 
parents 
Combine 
academics 
with finances 
•Difference 
in ideas 
verses how 
they live out 
in practice 
•If EFM only 
sees costs and 
ignores 
pedagogy 
•Risky if 
final say is 
money 
Jeffrey 
Mirel 
 •Government 
liberalizing 
charters 
•Eliminates 
collective 
bargaining  
•---
Privatization 
•No common 
core (no 
stability) 
•No way to 
know how 
they’re doing 
•Autocratic 
•A leader 
with strong 
vision to do 
good can 
make change 
•Signs of 
possibility 
depending on 
leader 
•Government 
forcing 
mayoral 
control 
•Mayoral 
control bound 
up in other 
issues (racial) 
Rebecca 
Platte 
 
•Policy could 
incentivize 
good charters 
in low 
income areas 
•Startup 
money and 
year to plan, 
new school to 
build up! 
create culture 
•Charter 
school 
operators 
want cap 
lifted 
•EAA will 
make worse 
schools/chart
ers: 
•-No quality 
control 
•-School 
governance 
doesn’t 
matter: poor 
students still 
fail (mirrored 
in nation)  
•Opening 
cap: only 
money-
efficient, for-
profit charters 
thrive 
•Meant state 
paying 
attention! 
•Increased 
accountabilit
y (audience) 
•Consolidate
d sources, 
closing public 
schools! 
•Long-term 
structural 
viability 
•Finances 
and personnel 
management 
doesn’t 
=making 
different for 
kids 
•Student 
achievement 
hasn’t 
improved  
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